Louisiana Future Advance Mortgages: A 20-Year Retrospective by Willenzik, David S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 75 | Number 3
Spring 2015
Louisiana Future Advance Mortgages: A 20-Year
Retrospective
David S. Willenzik
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
David S. Willenzik, Louisiana Future Advance Mortgages: A 20-Year Retrospective, 75 La. L. Rev. (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol75/iss3/6
 
 
Louisiana Future Advance Mortgages: A 20-Year 
Retrospective 
David S. Willenzik 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Introduction ..........................................................................615 
I. Louisiana Collateral Mortgages ...........................................617 
 A. History and Purpose .......................................................618 
 B. How Future Advance Louisiana Collateral 
  Mortgages Work ............................................................621 
 C. 1990 Changes in Governing Law...................................623 
 1. Louisiana UCC Article 9 Applicable to 
  Post-1989 Louisiana Collateral Mortgages ..............625 
 2. The Louisiana Collateral Mortgage Statute .............626 
 D. Provisions of Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9 and 
  the Louisiana Collateral Mortgage Statute that 
  Apply to Post-1989 Collateral Mortgages .....................627 
 1. Definitions ................................................................627 
 2. Ability of Post-1989 Collateral Mortgages to 
  Secure Multiple Present and Future Cross- 
  Collateralized Debt ..................................................627 
 3. Possession Perfection Required: Loss of 
  Possession and Its Legal Consequences ..................629 
 4. Future Advance Priority Rights of Post-1989 
  Collateral Mortgages ................................................632 
 5. No Loss of Priority in Lapsed Credit Situations ......634 
 6. Effectiveness of a Collateral Mortgage in a 
  Delayed, Anticipatory Credit Situation When 
  There is No Contemporaneous Loan or Forward 
  Commitment to Lend at a Later Date.......................638 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by DAVID S. WILLENZIK. 
  Special Counsel to Jones Walker, LLP, New Orleans LA, and Adjunct 
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 
teaching the course on UCC Article 9 secured transactions. Mr. Willenzik 
chaired the committee that drafted the original 1990 version of Louisiana UCC 
Article 9 enacted under Act No. 135, §3, 1989 La. Acts 417, and the 1989 UCC 
Implementation Act enacted under Act No. 137, 1989 La. Acts 527. 
614 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
II. Significant Collateral Mortgage Case Law Developments 
 Since 1994 ............................................................................642 
 A. Diamond Services Corporation v. Benoit .......................642 
 1. Facts and Disposition ...............................................643 
 2. The Third Circuit’s Decision in Benoit .....................643 
 3. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision in 
  Benoit .......................................................................644 
 4. Critique of Benoit ......................................................646 
 5. Additional Comments ..............................................649 
 6. Significance of Benoit ..............................................652 
 B. Alaska Southern Partners v. Baxley ...............................652 
 C. Hibernia National Bank v. Contractor’s Equipment 
  & Supply, Inc. ................................................................652 
 D. Ellis Construction, Inc. v. Vieux Carre Resort 
  Properties, L.L.C. ...........................................................653 
 E. Gutierrez v. Baldridge ...................................................654 
 F. Sciortino v. Bank of Louisiana .......................................655 
III. Multiple Indebtedness Mortgages ........................................655 
 A. History and Purpose .......................................................655 
 B. Ability to Secure Future Advances on a Retroactive 
  Priority Basis ..................................................................656 
 C. Comparison with Collateral Mortgages .........................659 
 D. Form and Content Requirements Applicable to 
  Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage Agreements ...............661 
 1. Title and Definition of Mortgagee ...........................661 
 2. Definition of the Secured Indebtedness ...................662 
 3. Grant of Mortgage ....................................................664 
 4. Declaration of Intent that the Mortgage Secure 
  Future Advances ......................................................665 
 5. Duration of Mortgage ..............................................666 
 6. Mortgage Cancellation .............................................667 
 7. No Ne Varietur Paraph .............................................667 
IV. Significant Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage Cases ............668 
 A. In re Hari Aum ...............................................................668 
 1. Facts and Disposition ...............................................668 
 2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision............................669 
 3. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision ....................................673 
2015] LOUISIANA FUTURE ADVANCE MORTGAGES 615 
 
 
 
 4. Significance of Hari Aum ........................................674 
 5. Critique of Hari Aum ...............................................675 
 6. Question Raised by Hari Aum: Is It Necessary 
  or Good Practice for the Mortgagor to Execute 
  an Acknowledgement of Mortgage Each Time 
  that an Additional Advance is Made? ......................678 
 B. KeyBank National Association v. Perkins 
  Rowe Associates, LLC ....................................................679 
 1. Facts and Disposition ...............................................679 
 2. The District Court’s Decision ..................................681 
 3. Significance of the KeyBank Decision .....................685 
 4. Question: Can Mortgage Priority Rights be 
  Transferred on a Naked Assignment Basis 
  Independently of the Secured Debt? ........................687 
 5. Additional Concerns ................................................692 
 C. JAB of Oakdale, LLC v. Oakwood Inn 
  Development Corp. ........................................................693 
 1. Facts and Disposition ...............................................693 
 2. The Third Circuit Decision ......................................693 
V. Are Collateral Mortgages Obsolete? ....................................694 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article is an update and expansion of two previous 1994 
articles on future advance Louisiana collateral mortgages and 
multiple indebtedness mortgages: D. Willenzik, Future Advance 
Priority Rights of Louisiana Collateral Mortgages: Legislative 
Revisions, New Rules, and a Modern Alternative,1 and M. Rubin, D. 
Willenzik, and M. Moore, Is the Collateral Mortgage Obsolete?2 
Both of these articles were published at a time when the original 
1990 version of Louisiana UCC Article 93 and the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 1. See generally 55 LA. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Willenzik, Future 
Advance Priority Rights or “1994 Willenzik Article”]. This article updates and 
expands upon, and is intended to be read in conjunction with, the 1994 
Willenzik Article. 
 2. See generally Michael Rubin, David Willenzik, & M. Moore, Is the 
Collateral Mortgage Obsolete?, 41 LA. B.J. 529 (1994). 
 3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-101 to 10:9-710 (2002). Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 10:9-101 was first enacted under Act No. 135, § 3, 
1989 La. Acts 417, effective January 1, 1990, and was subsequently amended 
and reenacted under Act No. 128, §1, 2001 La. Acts 206, effective July 1, 2001. 
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collateral mortgage statute4 had been in effect for less than five 
years, and at a time when the 1991 comprehensive revisions to the 
mortgage articles of the Louisiana Civil Code5 had been in effect 
for less than three years. Louisiana collateral mortgage law has 
undergone significant changes over the past 20 years. The most 
important of these changes was the enactment of the 2001 
comprehensive revisions to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code,6 which apply to post-July 1, 2001 UCC pledges of Louisiana 
collateral mortgage notes and accessory collateral mortgages.  
Part I of this Article discusses the sections of Revised Louisiana 
UCC Article 9 and the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute that 
apply to post-July 1, 2001 collateral mortgages.7 Part II discusses 
significant Louisiana collateral mortgage case law developments 
over the past 20 years, including critical analysis of the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 
This statute is known as the “Louisiana UCC,” or “Louisiana UCC Article 9,” or 
sometimes “Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9.” The Louisiana UCC was 
previously known as the “Louisiana Commercial Laws.” See LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 10:1-101 (1974); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-101 (amended by 
Act No. 533, § 1, 2006 La. Acts 2041) (changing the name of Title 10 of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes to the Louisiana Uniform Commercial Code). This 
article intentionally refers to the Uniform Commercial Code using the acronym 
“UCC” (without periods) rather than the abbreviation “U.C.C.” (with periods). 
UCC is the preferred reference to the Uniform Commercial Code. This article 
also intentionally refers to the parts of the Louisiana UCC as “Articles”; whereas 
Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes refers to the parts of the Louisiana 
UCC as “Chapters” so as not to cause confusion with articles of the Louisiana 
Civil Code and with the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure. “Articles” is the 
preferred reference to the parts of the UCC. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references to the sections of Louisiana UCC Article 9 in this article refer to 
Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9, effective July 1, 2001. The sections of 
Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9 are cited in the text of this article as 
“Louisiana UCC § 9-___.” Similarly, the sections of the multi-state version of 
UCC Article 9 (as distinguished from the Louisiana UCC) are cited in the text 
of, and in the footnotes to this article as “UCC § 9-___.” 
 4. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5550 (1990) (enacted under Act No. 137, 
§7, 1989 La. Acts 527, effective January 1, 1990). 
 5. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3278–3298 (amended by and reenacted under Act 
No. 652, §1, 1991 La. Acts 2068). 
 6. Article 9 of the UCC was totally revised on a nation-wide basis 
effective as of July 1, 2001. The Louisiana version of Revised UCC Article 9 
became effective on the national implementation date. Act No. 128, 2001 La. 
Acts 206. 
 7. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1 (discussing 
sections of the 1990 version of Louisiana UCC Article 9 applying to UCC 
pledges of collateral mortgage notes from January 1, 1990, through June 30, 
2001). This Article updates the 1994 Willenzik Article by discussing the 
sections of Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9 that now (since July 1, 2001) 
exclusively apply to pledges of Louisiana collateral mortgage notes.  
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Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond Services Corporation v. 
Benoit.8 Part III of this Article discusses the rules that apply to 
future advance Louisiana multiple indebtedness mortgages as a 
modern alternative to old-style collateral mortgages. Part IV 
discusses significant multiple indebtedness mortgage cases decided 
over the past 20 years, including critical analysis of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court and Fifth Circuit decisions in In re Hari 
Aum,9 and the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana decision in KeyBank National Association v. Perkins 
Rowe Associates, LLC.10 Part V of this Article concludes with a 
discussion of the prevailing trend away from continued use of old-
style Louisiana collateral mortgages in favor of the more modern 
and less risky alternative of using Louisiana multiple indebtedness 
mortgages as a preferred open-end mortgage instrument.11 
I. LOUISIANA COLLATERAL MORTGAGES 
This Part discusses the history, purpose, and structure of 
Louisiana collateral mortgages and the rules that applied to 
collateral mortgages granted prior to January 1, 1990, that were 
previously subject to the pledge articles of the Louisiana Civil 
Code.12 This Part further discusses the rules that presently apply to 
post-1989 collateral mortgages granted on and after January 1, 
1990, that are now exclusively subject to the possession perfection 
                                                                                                             
 8. See 780 So. 2d 367 (La. 2001). 
 9. No. 10-12931, 2011 WL 2746149 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 714 F. 
3d 274 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 10. See 823 F. Supp. 2d 399 (M.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 407 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (adopting the reasoning of the district court). 
 11. An open-end mortgage is capable of securing multiple present and 
future loans, loan advances, and other indebtedness and performance obligations 
under a single mortgage instrument. 
 12. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3133–3175 (1870) (as subsequently amended). The 
Civil Code pledge articles were recently amended and reenacted on a 
comprehensive basis. See Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts (effective Jan. 2015). The 
Civil Code pledge articles do not apply to pledges of collateral that otherwise 
are subject to encumbrance under Louisiana UCC Article 9, including 
specifically to pledges of Louisiana collateral mortgage notes, which remain 
exclusively subject to Louisiana UCC Article 9. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3142–
3143 (2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3142 cmt. c (2015). The 2015 amended 
pledge articles have only limited applicability to security interests in rights 
under certain types of insurance policies and annuity products that are excluded 
from coverage under Louisiana UCC Article 9. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3142 
cmt. c (2015). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 10:9-109(d) (2002) (listing the 
limited types of collateral that are excluded from coverage under Louisiana 
UCC Article 9).  
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(pledge) provisions of Louisiana UCC Article 9 and to the Louisiana 
collateral mortgage statute. 
A. History and Purpose 
Louisiana collateral mortgages originated in the mid-19th 
century out of the commercial necessity for an enforceable security 
device that could encumber both immovable and movable property 
and that could secure multiple loans, revolving lines of credit,13 
and performance obligations with retroactive ranking priority vis-
à-vis potential competing third persons back to the time the 
mortgage instrument was originally recorded in the parish 
mortgage records.14 At that time (again the mid-19th century), and 
continuing until January 1, 1992, when the 1991 comprehensive 
revisions to the mortgage articles of the Louisiana Civil Code first 
took effect, Louisiana ordinary conventional mortgages15 were able 
to secure only one-time extensions of credit evidenced by a 
promissory note paraphed ne varietur for identification with the 
mortgage.16 Ordinary conventional mortgages were not able to 
secure multiple loans, revolving lines of credit, and other present 
and future cross-collateralized indebtedness because of the then-
Civil Code rule that the lien of a conventional mortgage is 
                                                                                                             
 13. A revolving line of credit is an open-end credit facility under which a 
borrower may request and obtain multiple loan advances from time to time, one 
or more times, make principal reduction payments, and then reborrow again 
back up to the borrower’s pre-established credit limit. 
 14. See Levy v. Ford, 6 So. 671 (La. 1889); Merchants’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Jamison, 25 La. Ann. 363 (1873); Succession of Dolhonde, 21 La. Ann. 3 
(1869); see also Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Benoit, 780 So. 2d 367, 370–71 (La. 
2001); Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 7. 
 15. For purposes of explanation, there are four forms of mortgages 
recognized under Louisiana law. The first is an ordinary conventional mortgage 
that secures a one-time extension of credit evidenced by a promissory mortgage 
note. The second is a staged-advance mortgage, which generally is used incident 
to construction financings. See infra note 21. The third form of mortgage is a 
collateral mortgage, which can secure multiple loans, revolving lines of credit, 
as well as other multiple present and future cross-collateralized indebtedness and 
performance obligations. See infra Part I. The fourth form of mortgage 
recognized under Louisiana law is a multiple indebtedness mortgage, which is 
the modern alternative to old style collateral mortgages. See infra Part III.  
 16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3384 (1870) (previously requiring mortgage notes to 
be paraphed ne varietur for identification with the mortgages they secured). This 
paraph requirement was eliminated in 1992 at the time the Civil Code mortgage 
articles were revised. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298(C) (2015); see also LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 3325 (2015) (“[A] note or other written obligation which is secured by 
an act of mortgage . . . need not be paraphed for identification with such 
mortgage . . . and need not recite that it is secured by such mortgage.”).  
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automatically reduced on a pro tanto, dollar-for-dollar basis as 
principal payments were made under the secured mortgage note.17  
Recognizing that the lack of an enforceable open-end Civil 
Code mortgage instrument had the effect of inhibiting economic 
growth, certain innovative commercial lawyers of the mid-19th 
century reasoned that, although the Civil Code did not permit 
mortgages to directly secure multiple loans, revolving lines of 
credit, and other present and future cross-collateralized debt,18 the 
pledge articles of the Civil Code, namely articles 3103 and 3125 of 
the 1825 Code, contained no such limitation. These two 1825 
articles, when read together, provided that a Civil Code pledge 
could secure any lawful obligation up to the maximum amount 
stipulated in the pledge agreement.19 The innovative commercial 
lawyers who first came up with the concept of a collateral 
mortgage further reasoned that, by having a mortgage secure a 
promissory note payable to bearer on demand, and then pledging 
that note to secure the real intended indebtedness, a mortgage 
could indirectly secure multiple loans, revolving lines of credit, 
                                                                                                             
 17. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3252 (1825); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3285 (1870) 
(“[I]t is essentially necessary to the existence of a mortgage, that there shall be a 
principal debt to serve as a foundation for it. Hence it happens, that in all cases 
where the principal debt is extinguished, the mortgage disappears with it. . . .”). 
See also Mente & Co. v. Levy, 107 So. 318, 329 (La. 1926); Leon A. Minsky, 
Inc. v. Providence Fashions, Inc., 404 So. 2d 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1981) 
(requiring reduction of lien of a conventional mortgage on a pro tanto, dollar-
for-dollar basis as principal payments are made under the secured mortgage note 
(citing Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy, 260 So. 2d 628, 632 (La. 1972))). By 
way of example, the lien or encumbrance of an ordinary conventional mortgage 
securing a $100,000 mortgage note automatically is reduced to $75,000 as a 
result of the borrower paying down principal under the note by $25,000. Former 
Code articles necessarily precluded the borrower from re-borrowing the $25,000 
previously paid, and then having the original mortgage secure the re-upped 
$100,000 outstanding loan balance. See also Expose des Motifs to Act No. 652, 
1991 La. Acts 2068 (discussing further the considerations preventing an 
ordinary conventional mortgage from securing revolving lines of credit and 
other present and future cross-collateralized indebtedness). 
 18. See Thrift Funds Canal, 260 So. 2d at 630; First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Moss, 616 So. 2d 648 (La. 1993).  
 19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3103 (1825); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3131 (1870) 
(“Every lawful obligation may be enforced by the auxiliary obligation of 
pledge.”). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3125 (1825) (“But this privilege [pledge] 
takes place against third persons, only in the case that the pawn is proven by an 
act made either in a public form or under private signature . . . provided also, 
that whatever may be the form of the act, it mentions the amount of the debt as 
well as the species and nature of the thing given in pledge.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 
3158 (1870) (pledge of promissory notes may secure multiple loans, lines of 
credit, and other cross-collateralized debt up to the maximum dollar amount 
specified in the pledge agreement).  
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and other present and future cross-collateralized indebtedness up to 
the maximum amount agreed to by the parties.20 
Thus, the future advance Louisiana collateral mortgage was 
created as a creature of commercial necessity and of the ingenuity of 
lawyers of the mid-19th century.21 As discussed in Part V of this 
Article, collateral mortgages are still being used today 
notwithstanding that Louisiana law now offers a more modern and 
less-risky alternative open-end mortgage instrument in the form of a 
multiple indebtedness mortgage.22 
                                                                                                             
 20. The most noteworthy decision with respect to the ability of pre-1990 
collateral mortgages to secure multiple loans, revolving lines of credit and other 
present and future cross-collateralized debt is New Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. 
Toups, 261 So. 2d 252 (La. Ct. App. 1972). See Thomas J. McDonald, Jr., 
Security Rights–Mortgage–Retroactive Ranking of Future Advances Secured by 
Collateral Mortgage, 47 TUL. L. REV. 211 (1972); Max Nathan & H. Gayle 
Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REV. 497, 517–24 (1973); see 
also Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 10; Tex. Bank 
of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667, 674 (La. 1984); New Orleans Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass’n v. Lee, 449 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Alaynick v. Jefferson 
Bank & Trust Co., 451 So. 2d 627 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Mardis v. Hollanger, 
426 So. 2d 392 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Bank of Jena v. Rowlen, 370 So. 2d 146 
(La. Ct. App. 1979); Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. F & W Constr., 357 So. 2d 1226 
(La. Ct. App. 1978).  
 21. This article uses the UCC term “future advance” to describe related and 
unrelated loans and other extensions of credit, whether made on a line of credit 
basis or otherwise, and whether made pursuant to a commitment. See LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-304(c) (Supp. 2015). Louisiana collateral mortgages should 
not be confused with so-called “staged-advance” mortgages, which generally are 
used to secure real estate construction loans that are funded on a staged-advance, 
non-revolving line of credit basis. See Thrift Funds Canal, 260 So. 2d at 630; 
Am. Bank v. Red Diamond Supply Co., 402 So. 2d 729, 731 (La. Ct. App. 
1978); Cameron Brown S., Inc. v. E. Glen Oaks, Inc., 341 So. 2d 450, 458 (La. 
Ct. App. 1976); Bernard K. Vetter, The Validity and Ranking of Future Advance 
Mortgages in Louisiana, 21 LOY. L. REV. 141 (1975); see also MICHAEL H. 
RUBIN, LOUISIANA LAW OF SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS 92 (LexisNexis 2011) 
(discussing staged-advance mortgages). Example: A $300,000 construction loan 
to be funded on a non-self-replenishing (closed-end), staged-advance basis, with 
an initial funding or draw in the amount of $50,000 at time of commencement of 
work, a second funding or draw in the amount of $100,000 upon completion of 
the building structure and exterior, a third funding or draw in the amount of 
$120,000 upon completion of the building interior, and the remaining $30,000 in 
the form of a 10% retainer to be funded upon final acceptance of the building 
and improvements. Under this example, the borrower has no right to pay down 
the loan and then reborrow additional funds back up to the original $300,000 
amount of the borrower’s promissory note. 
 22. See infra Part III.  
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B. How Future Advance Louisiana Collateral Mortgages Work 
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized in First Guaranty 
Bank v. Alford23 that “a collateral mortgage is not a ‘pure’ 
mortgage; rather, it is a result of judicial recognition that one can 
pledge a note secured by a mortgage and use this pledge to secure 
yet another debt.”24 As the Supreme Court further stated in Texas 
Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg,25 and again in Diamond Services 
Corporation v. Benoit,26 “the collateral mortgage . . . combines the 
security devices of both mortgage and pledge.”27 
Typically, there are four documents in a collateral mortgage 
package:28 (1) a collateral mortgage under which the mortgagor 
grants a mortgage on the mortgagor’s immovable property;29 (2) a 
collateral mortgage note payable to bearer on demand; (3) a 
collateral pledge/UCC security agreement; and (4) one or more hand 
notes or other writings evidencing the debtor’s30 true indebtedness. 
                                                                                                             
 23. 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978).  
 24. See id. at 1302; see also Michael H. Rubin, The Work of the Louisiana 
Appellate Courts for the 1978–1979 Term-Security Devices, 40 LA. L. REV. 572, 
578–79 (1980) [hereinafter Rubin, 1978–1979 Term]. 
 25. 457 So. 2d 667, 671 (La. 1984). 
 26. 780 So. 2d 367, 372 (La. 2001). See further discussion of Benoit infra 
Part II.A. 
 27. Benoit, 780 So. 2d at 381. The Supreme Court stated that Nathan and 
Marshall recognized the collateral mortgage device as a “hybrid” and 
pronounced it “the weird blend of pledge and mortgage.” Id. at 372 n.8. “The 
device has also been described as the strange alchemy of the pledge of a 
mortgage created by the pledgor.” Id. (citing Nathan & Marshall, supra note 20, 
at 498, 521). Nathan and Marshall explained, “[A]s the very name implies, the 
[collateral mortgage] device contemplates that the mortgage note does not 
represent an actual debt but will be issued as collateral to secure such debts.” 
Nathan & Marshall, supra note 20, at 498, 521.  
 28. Cameron Brown S., Inc. v. E. Glen Oaks, Inc., 341 So. 2d 450, 458 (La. 
Ct. App. 1976) (discussing the concept of a collateral mortgage package). 
 29. Collateral chattel mortgages on corporeal movable property are no 
longer used after the January 1, 1990 effective date of Louisiana UCC Article 9. 
Security interests in corporeal movables, including inventory and equipment in 
bulk, are now, since January 1, 1990, exclusively subject to Louisiana UCC 
Article 9.  
 30. This article uses the UCC term “debtor” to refer to the party granting a 
security interest in a collateral mortgage note or other UCC collateral. See LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102(a)(28) (Supp. 2015). As the context may require, 
the term “debtor” also may refer to the mortgagor under a Louisiana collateral 
mortgage. This article further uses the UCC term “secured party” to refer to the 
party in whose favor a security interest is granted. See id. § 10:9-102(b)(72). As 
the context may require, the term “secured party” also may refer to the 
mortgagee under a Louisiana collateral mortgage and the pledgee of a pledged 
collateral mortgage note. The UCC terms debtor and secured party are 
appropriate for use when discussing Louisiana collateral mortgages because the 
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The primary security interest in a collateral mortgage arrangement is 
the UCC pledge31 of the collateral mortgage note, which secures the 
mortgagor’s (or third-party obligor’s)32 true indebtedness. The 
collateral mortgage is an accessory, secondary security interest33 that 
directly secures the pledged collateral mortgage note and that 
indirectly secures the true indebtedness represented by one or more 
hand notes or other evidence of indebtedness. The way a collateral 
mortgage works is that the mortgagor grants the collateral mortgage 
in favor of the mortgagee to secure payment of the collateral 
mortgage note. The mortgagor then simultaneously pledges or 
grants a UCC possessory security interest in the collateral mortgage 
note and delivers the pledged note into the secured party’s 
possession34 to secure the debtor’s (or third-party obligor’s) true 
indebtedness.35 Assuming that (a) all of the requirements for 
                                                                                                             
 
primary security interest in a collateral mortgage arrangement is the UCC pledge 
of the collateral mortgage note. The collateral mortgage securing the pledged 
collateral mortgage note is an accessory, secondary security device.  
 31. The UCC does not include the term “pledge,” which is a Louisiana Civil 
Code and pre-UCC Article 9 common law term. Nevertheless, practitioners, 
legal scholars, and courts continue to refer to UCC possessory security interests 
in collateral as pledges. This article follows that practice; although it is 
important to keep in mind that pre-1990 Louisiana pledges of collateral 
(including pledges of collateral mortgage notes) were subject to the pledge 
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, as subsequently amended; whereas 
post-1989 pledges of most types of collateral (again including pledges of 
collateral mortgage notes) are now, since January 1, 1990, exclusively subject to 
Louisiana UCC Article 9.  
 32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3295 (2015) (recognizing mortgages securing the 
indebtedness of a third person (i.e., a third-party mortgage)). Similarly, 
Louisiana UCC Article 9 permits a debtor to grant a UCC security interest in 
collateral to secure the indebtedness of a third party obligor. See LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 10:9-102(a)(28) (Supp. 2015) (definition of “debtor”); Id. § 10:9-
102(a)(59) (definition of “obligor”). In this context, the debtor is the person 
granting a UCC security interest to secure a third party obligor’s indebtedness, 
and the obligor is the person obligated to pay the secured indebtedness. This is 
an important distinction. 
 33. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3282 (2015) (“[A] mortgage is accessory to the 
obligation that it secures.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3284–3285 (1870). 
 34. The debtor must deliver the original signed collateral mortgage note into 
the secured party’s possession in order for the pledge of the collateral mortgage 
note to be complete or perfected. See Valerie S. Meiners, Comment, Formal 
Requirements of Pledge under Civil Code Article 3158 and Related Articles, 48 
LA. L. REV. 129 (1987); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-312(b)(4) (Supp. 
2015) (providing that the exclusive method of perfecting a UCC security interest 
in a Louisiana collateral mortgage note is by the secured party taking possession 
of the note in pledge). 
 35. The secured indebtedness may include any lawful obligation of the 
debtor, or of a third party obligor, in favor of the secured party or its successors 
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perfection36 of a UCC possessory security interest in the pledged 
note are fully satisfied and remain satisfied at all pertinent times,37 
(b) the collateral mortgage note is not allowed to prescribe,38 and 
(c) the ten-year inscriptive period of the mortgage is not allowed to 
lapse,39 then the lien of the accessory collateral mortgage will be 
entitled to retroactive ranking priority vis-à-vis potential 
intervening creditors back to the time that (i) the mortgage was 
originally recorded, (ii) the collateral mortgage note was delivered 
in pledge to the secured party, or (iii) the secured party initially 
funded the loan or issued a binding loan commitment to advance 
funds to the borrower at a later date, whichever is the last to 
occur.40  
C. 1990 Changes in Governing Law 
Prior to January 1, 1990, pledges of Louisiana collateral 
mortgage notes were subject to the pledge articles of the 1870 
Louisiana Civil Code, most notably including former Civil Code 
article 3158, which permitted a pledged collateral mortgage note to 
secure multiple loans, lines of credit, and other present and future 
obligations of the mortgagor (or third-party obligor) on an open-
end, cross-collateralized basis.41 This assumed that the debtor’s 
                                                                                                             
 
and assigns. There absolutely is no requirement that the secured indebtedness be 
evidenced by one or more hand notes or other writing.  
 36. Perfection is a UCC term and means that the security interest is effective 
and enforceable as against third persons claiming competing rights in and to the 
same collateral.  
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 101–105 (discussing the four 
requirements that must be satisfied in order for the UCC pledge of a collateral 
mortgage note to be fully perfected, and to remain fully perfected). 
 38. See infra text accompanying note 97 (discussing the need to acknowledge 
certain third party collateral mortgage notes every five years so that the debtor’s 
payment obligations under such notes do not prescribe).  
 39. See infra note 96 (discussing the requirement that collateral mortgages 
be reinscribed on the public mortgage records every ten years). 
 40. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 11; 
Nathan & Marshall, supra note 20, at 497 n.8, 523; Michael H. Rubin, Security 
Devices, Developments in the Law, 1980–1981, 42 LA. L. REV. 413, 421 (1982). 
 41. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158 (1870). Former article 3158 provided in 
pertinent part: 
Whenever a pledge of any instrument is made . . . to secure advances to 
be made up to a certain amount, and, if so desired or provided, to 
secure any other obligations or liabilities of the pledgor or any other 
person, to the pledgee, or its successor, then existing or thereafter 
arising, up to the limit of the pledge, such as may be included in a 
crosscollateralization clause, and the pledged instrument or item 
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collateral pledge agreement contained a broad, expansive 
definition of the secured indebtedness to encompass not only the 
loan and note for which the collateral mortgage was being initially 
granted, but also any and all other related and unrelated loans, 
extensions of credit, and obligations that the debtor (or third-party 
obligor) may then and thereafter owe to or incur in favor of the 
secured party and its successors and assigns, of every nature and 
kind whatsoever, all up to a maximum stipulated dollar amount.42 
This expansive definition of the secured indebtedness is sometimes 
referred to as a “cross-collateralization,” “dragnet,” or “gorilla” 
clause and was the key contractual provision that allowed pre-1990 
pledges of collateral mortgage notes and accessory collateral 
mortgages to secure multiple present and future debts and other 
obligations.43 
                                                                                                             
 
remains . . . in the hands of the pledgee or its successor, the instrument 
or item may secure any other obligations or liabilities of the pledgor or 
any other person to the pledgee or its successor, then existing or 
thereafter arising, up to the limit of the pledge, without any added 
notification or other formality, and the pledge shall be valid against 
third persons if made in good faith; and such additional loans and 
advances or other obligations or liabilities shall be secured by the 
collateral to the same extent as if they came into existence when the 
instrument or item was originally pledged and the pledge was made to 
secure them.  
Id. 
 42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158 (1870) (requiring that collateral pledge agreements 
in use prior to the January 1, 1990 effective date of the Louisiana UCC Article 9 
specify the maximum dollar amount to be secured by the pledge of the collateral 
mortgage note). Louisiana UCC Article 9 contains no such maximum dollar 
amount limitation.  
 43. Future advance/cross-collateralization language is included in most well-
drafted collateral pledge/UCC security agreements and is the key contractual 
provision that permits post-1989 Louisiana collateral mortgages to secure multiple 
present and future debts and other obligations. For the most part, cross-
collateralization has replaced the old-style practice of the debtor executing a new 
collateral pledge agreement each time that a new secured loan is made, thereby 
repledging/reissuing the same collateral mortgage note over and over again. See 
Odom v. Cherokee Homes, 165 So. 2d 855, 865 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (discussing 
this old style practice of repledging or reissuing a collateral mortgage note over 
and over again to secure subsequent loans); see also Willenzik, Future Advance 
Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 17–19; Nathan & Marshall, supra note 20, at 
504, 513–14; Max Nathan, Jr. & Anthony P. Dunbar, The Collateral Mortgage: 
Logic and Experience, 49 LA. L. REV. 39, 63–71 (1988).  
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1. Louisiana UCC Article 9 Applicable to Post-1989 Louisiana 
Collateral Mortgages  
Louisiana collateral mortgage law significantly changed on 
January 1, 1990, when the Louisiana version of UCC Article 9 first 
took effect.44 As of that date, pledges of Louisiana collateral mortgage 
notes were no longer subject to the pledge articles of the Louisiana 
Civil Code and instead became exclusively subject to Louisiana UCC 
Article 9.45 Additionally, the various collateral mortgage cases that 
previously applied to pre-1990 collateral mortgages (including Odom 
v. Cherokee Homes,46 New Orleans Silversmiths v. Toups,47 First 
Guaranty Bank v. Alford,48 Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg,49 and 
Citizens National Bank v. Coates50) no longer applied to post-1989 
collateral mortgages and could no longer be cited as authority by 
practitioners and by the courts.51 
This Article adopts a conservative position differentiating 
between pre-1990 collateral mortgages formerly subject to the Civil 
Code pledge articles and post-1989 collateral mortgages, which are 
now exclusively subject to Louisiana UCC Article 9 and the 
Louisiana collateral mortgage statute. This conservative position is 
based on (i) the fact that the original 1990 version of Louisiana UCC 
Article 9 was not made retroactively applicable to then-outstanding 
secured transactions,52 and (ii) former Louisiana Civil Code article 
3133.1,53 which provided that the pledge articles of the Civil Code no 
longer apply to UCC pledges of collateral granted on and after January 
1, 1990. Now to be sure, some practitioners and legal scholars may 
argue that, as a result of the 2001 enactment of Revised Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 44. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-601 (1990).  
 45. See id. § 10:9-602(a); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133.1 (1990) (enacted by Act 
No. 137, 1989 La. Acts 527).  
 46. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
 47. 261 So. 2d 252 (La. Ct. App. 1972). 
 48. 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978). 
 49. 457 So. 2d 667 (La. 1984). 
 50. 563 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
 51. These cases were decided based upon pre-1990 collateral mortgage law, 
which significantly changed as of January 1, 1990, when Louisiana UCC Article 
9 and the collateral mortgage statute took effect. 
 52. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-602 (1990) (providing that pre-Article 
9 secured transactions that were outstanding as of January 1, 1990, remained 
subject to pre-Article 9 Louisiana law). By way of comparison, the 2001 
transition rules that applied at the time Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9 went 
into effect purported to make Revised Article 9 retroactively applicable to all 
secured transactions that were outstanding as of July 1, 2001. 
 53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133.1 (1990) (enacted by Act No. 137, 1989 La. Acts 
527) (“This Title shall apply to pledges of movables that are delivered prior to the 
time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes effective . . . .”). 
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UCC Article 9, all then-outstanding pledges of collateral mortgage 
notes, including pre-1990 pledges of collateral mortgage notes 
granted before January 1, 1990, became subject to Revised Louisiana 
UCC Article 9. This contrary position is based on the fact that the 
2001 comprehensive revisions to UCC Article 9 were made 
retroactively applicable to all then-outstanding secured transactions 
falling within the scope of Revised UCC Article 9, including secured 
transactions which (prior to July 1, 2001) were excluded from 
coverage under the UCC.54 
The question raised is what difference does it make whether the 
Civil Code articles on pledge or Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9 
apply to pre-1990 pledges of Louisiana collateral mortgage notes? 
In truth, it makes very little difference because only a relatively 
small number of pre-1990 Louisiana collateral mortgages remain 
outstanding as of this date, some 25 years after Louisiana UCC 
Article 9 first took effect. The vast majority of pre-1990 collateral 
mortgages have been either fully paid and satisfied or refinanced 
and replaced with substitute mortgages. 
2. The Louisiana Collateral Mortgage Statute  
Another significant 1990 change in the law applicable to 
Louisiana collateral mortgages was the enactment of the Louisiana 
collateral mortgage statute. Prior to the collateral mortgage statute 
taking effect on January 1, 1990, Louisiana collateral mortgages were 
jurisprudential in nature and subject to unpredictable and sometimes 
inconsistent interpretation and application by practitioners and the 
courts.55 The drafters of the 1989 UCC Implementation Bill sought to 
codify the law of collateral mortgages and thus make the law more 
certain and predictable.56 
                                                                                                             
 54. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-702(a) (Supp. 2015) (“Except as 
otherwise provided in this Part, this Chapter [referring to Revised UCC Article 
9] applies to a transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien 
was entered into or created before July 1, 2001.”); see also id. § 10:9-702(b) 
(providing for additional 2001 transition rules implementing Revised UCC 
Article 9, which became effective on July 1, 2001).  
 55. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 11–30 
(critically discussing Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 671 (La. 
1984), Citizens National Bank v. Coates, 563 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1990), 
and other troublesome pre-Louisiana UCC Article 9 cases that no longer apply 
to post-1989 collateral mortgages). 
 56. See id. at 23–30 (discussing how the 1989 UCC drafting committee 
sought to legislatively correct some of the problems and legal uncertainties that 
arose out of Bozorg, Coates, and other troublesome, pre-Louisiana UCC Article 
9 collateral mortgage cases).  
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D. Provisions of Revised Louisiana UCC Article 9 and the 
Louisiana Collateral Mortgage Statute that Apply to Post-1989 
Collateral Mortgages 
1. Definitions  
Louisiana UCC Article 9 contains certain key definitions that 
apply to pledges of collateral mortgage notes. The term “collateral 
mortgage” is defined under section 5550(1) of the Louisiana 
collateral mortgage statute as “a mortgage that is given to secure a 
written obligation, such as a collateral mortgage note.”57 The term 
“collateral mortgage note” is defined under non-uniform Louisiana 
UCC section 9-102(d)(3) as “an instrument that is secured by a 
collateral mortgage on real property located in this state and 
executed for the purpose of being issued, pledged, or otherwise used 
as security for another obligation.”58 Collateral mortgage notes are 
considered to be a form of instrument for Louisiana UCC Article 9 
purposes. Non-uniform Louisiana UCC section 9-102(a)(47) 
provides that the term “instrument”—generally referring to 
negotiable and non-negotiable promissory notes and other written 
evidences of indebtedness transferable by delivery—also “includes a 
collateral mortgage note.”59 
2. Ability of Post-1989 Collateral Mortgages to Secure 
Multiple Present and Future Cross-Collateralized Debt  
As previously discussed, former Louisiana Civil Code article 
3158 was the lynchpin that permitted pre-1990 pledges of collateral 
mortgage notes and accessory collateral mortgages to secure 
multiple loans, revolving lines of credit, and other present and future 
cross-collateralized indebtedness.60 Louisiana UCC section 9-204(c) 
is the comparable section of Louisiana UCC Article 9 that permits 
post-1989 UCC pledges of collateral mortgage notes and accessory 
collateral mortgages to secure future advances and other open-end 
debt.61 “A [UCC] security agreement may provide that collateral 
secures . . .  future advances or other value, whether or not advances 
                                                                                                             
 57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5550(1) (2007). 
 58. Id. § 10:9-102(d)(3). The Louisiana version of Revised UCC Article 9 
contains a number of non-uniform provisions not found in the standard, multi-
state version of the UCC. See James A. Stuckey, Louisiana’s Non-Uniform 
Variations in U.C.C. Chapter 9, 62 LA. L. REV. 793 (2002).  
 59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102(a)(47) (Supp. 2015). See Stuckey, supra 
note 58, at 814–15. 
 60. See supra note 41. 
 61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-204(c) (2001). See also id. § 10:9-204(3). 
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or value are given pursuant to a commitment.”62 The Louisiana 
State Law Institute’s 2001 Revision Comments to Louisiana UCC 
section 9-204(c) further clarify that cross-collateralization of 
secured indebtedness is permitted under the Louisiana UCC. 
(b) Subsection (c) changes the language of former Chapter 9 
to state more clearly that the parties may by agreement 
provide that collateral secures future advances as well as past 
and present advances. This rule is consistent with Civil Code 
Article 3298 (mortgage may secure future obligations). The 
parties are free to agree that a security interest secures any 
lawful obligation whatsoever, including the performance of an 
act, or general or indefinite future obligations. The matter is 
one of contract, not law. For future advances to be covered, 
the obligations secured by the collateral must be within the 
intent of the parties’ agreement. Determining the obligations 
secured by collateral is solely a matter of construing the 
parties’ contract by applying normal principals of contract 
interpretation.63 
Louisiana UCC section 9-204(c) requires that, in order for a 
post-1989 pledge of a collateral mortgage note to secure future 
advances and other cross-collateralized indebtedness, the debtor’s 
UCC security agreement must contain a cross-collateralization 
clause in the form of a broad, expansive definition of the secured 
indebtedness.64 This is the key contractual provision that permits 
post-1989 collateral mortgages to secure other and future cross-
collateralized debt.  
Technically, there is no requirement under Louisiana UCC 
Article 9 that there be a written UCC security agreement when the 
secured party takes a possessory UCC security interest in pledged 
collateral,65 such as pledged stock and bond certificates 
                                                                                                             
 62. See In re Branch, 368 B.R. 80, 82 (Bankr. Col. 2006). The Colorado 
bankruptcy court applied Louisiana law, namely Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 10:9-204(c), to uphold the right of a Louisiana debtor to agree that UCC 
secured collateral, originally located in Louisiana and later moved to Colorado, 
could additionally secure other unrelated loans of the debtor to the secured party.  
 63. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-204 cmt. b (2001) (citations omitted). See 
also UCC § 9-204 cmt. 5 (2010) (citations omitted) (emphasizing that the changed 
wording of revised UCC § 9-204(c) was intended to reject the holdings of certain 
cases decided under former UCC § 9-204(3) limiting cross-collateralized future 
debts to those closely related to the originally secured loan); see, e.g., Blair v. 
Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 26 B.R. 228 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982).  
 64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158 (1870) (containing a similar requirement that 
applied to pre-1990 pledges of collateral mortgage notes). 
 65. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-203(b)(3)(B), (C) (2002). 
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(certificated securities)66 and promissory notes (instruments).67 The 
debtor’s agreement to grant a security interest in possessory 
collateral can be implied under the circumstances even though the 
debtor did not sign a written security agreement.68 Nevertheless, 
prudent lenders and their counsel continue to require debtors to 
execute collateral pledge/UCC security agreements as part of a 
post-1989 collateral mortgage package.69  
Additionally, there is no requirement under Louisiana UCC 
Article 9 that a UCC security agreement specify the maximum 
principal dollar amount of the secured indebtedness.70 This is in 
comparison to former Louisiana Civil Code article 3158, which 
required that the maximum secured amount be stated in pre-1990 
collateral pledge agreements.71 Furthermore, there is absolutely no 
requirement that the indebtedness secured by the pledge of the 
collateral mortgage note, and indirectly secured by the accessory 
collateral mortgage, be evidenced under one or more hand notes or 
some other writing, or that the secured indebtedness arise out of a 
loan or other debt obligation.72  
3. Possession Perfection Required: Loss of Possession and Its 
Legal Consequences73  
Although UCC section 9-312(a) and section 9-313(a) generally 
give a secured party the option of perfecting a UCC security interest 
in an instrument (e.g., a promissory note) either by filing a UCC 
financing statement (filing perfection), or by taking possession of 
the instrument in pledge (possession perfection), or by both filing 
and taking possession (dual perfection), non-uniform Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 66. See id. § 10:9-102(a)(49). 
 67. See id. § 10:9-102(a)(47). 
 68. See UCC § 9-203(b)(3) cmt. 4 (2010); see also Willenzik, Future Advance 
Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 42–43; Liberty Bank and Trust Co. v. Dapremont, 
844 So. 2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 2003).  
 69. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 13 n.57 
(“It remains good practice for creditors and their counsel always to use a 
separate written form of collateral pledge or UCC security agreement rather than 
to include pledge language in the borrower's evidentiary hand note.”). See also 
Rubin, supra note 40, at 422.  
 70. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 43. 
 71. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158 (1870) (requiring that the collateral pledge 
agreement affirmatively state the maximum dollar amount intended to be 
secured by the pledge of the collateral mortgage note).  
 72. A UCC security interest may secure any lawful obligation, including 
non-monetary performance obligations. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-
201(b)(35) (Supp. 2015) (definition of security interest). 
 73. The legal consequence of a secured party ceasing to possess the pledge 
collateral mortgage note was not discussed in the 1994 Willenzik Article.  
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UCC section 9-312(b)(4)74 provides that the exclusive method of 
perfecting a Louisiana UCC security interest in a collateral 
mortgage note is by possession.75 Possession perfection requires 
that the secured party or its collateral agent76 take and retain actual 
physical possession of the original signed collateral mortgage note 
at all pertinent times.77 It then necessarily follows that the secured 
party will cease to have a possession-perfected UCC security 
interest if the secured party or its collateral agent should, for any 
reason, no longer physically possess the original signed collateral 
mortgage note, such as by intentionally or unintentionally 
returning the pledged note to the debtor, or by losing, misplacing, 
or discarding the note, or by reducing the note to electronic form 
and then destroying the original.78  
The full legal consequences of the secured party ceasing to 
retain physical possession of the debtor’s original signed collateral 
mortgage note are subject to debate. Some practitioners and legal 
scholars may argue that the secured party’s loss of possession not 
only results in the secured party ceasing to have a possession-
perfected UCC security interest in the pledged note but also results 
in the accessory collateral mortgage ceasing to be effective as 
against third persons just as if the mortgage had never been 
recorded. This argument is based on the language of section 
5551(B) of the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute, which 
                                                                                                             
 74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-312(b)(4) (2002) (providing that a UCC 
security interest in a collateral mortgage note may be perfected only by the 
secured party taking possession of the pledged note under Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 10:9-313). 
 75. See id. § 10:9-102 cmt. (h)(2)(b) (“Most importantly, revised Chapter 9 
reproduces existing Louisiana law requiring possession of a collateral mortgage 
note for perfection. While Revised Chapter 9 follows revised U.C.C. Article 9 in 
changing the law to permit perfection by filing with respect to instruments 
generally, revised Chapter 9 varies to exclude collateral mortgage notes in that 
respect. Without this variation, a financing statement covering instruments 
might have the unintended effect of giving the secured party a mortgage over the 
debtor’s immovable property.” (citations omitted)); see also id. § 10:9-330 cmt. 
(“Although a collateral mortgage note is an instrument, perfection of a security 
interest in a collateral mortgage note is achieved only by possession, not by 
filing.”). 
 76. A third party collateral agent must be someone beyond the debtor’s 
control. See UCC § 9-313 cmt. 3 (2010). 
 77. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-313(d) (2002) (“If perfection of a 
security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by a secured party, 
perfection occurs no earlier than the time the secured party takes possession and 
continues only while the secured party retains possession.”). 
 78. See id. § 13:3733.1(J) (providing for digital imaging and destruction of 
financial institution loan documents and other records, with the notable 
exception that a secured lender must retain actual physical possession of pledged 
original collateral mortgage notes). 
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provides that a collateral mortgage maintains its ranking priority 
vis-à-vis competing third persons only so long as the secured party 
retains physical possession of the pledged collateral mortgage 
note.79 Other practitioners and legal scholars may argue to a 
greater extreme that failure of the secured party to retain physical 
possession of the pledged note has the draconian effect of 
rendering the mortgage ineffective as against the debtor and as a 
lien and encumbrance on the mortgaged property just as if the 
mortgage had never been granted in the first place. This more 
extreme position is based on the premise that the real security 
interest in a collateral mortgage arrangement is the pledge of the 
collateral mortgage note, and without the secured party continuing 
to hold on to the original signed note in pledge, the accessory 
mortgage becomes unenforceable and worthless.80 
The courts have yet to fully consider the legal consequences of 
a secured party ceasing to possess a pledged collateral mortgage 
note.81 Nonetheless, it is not a good idea for a secured party to give 
up possession or to misplace or otherwise dispose of a pledged 
collateral mortgage note under any circumstance. Furthermore, it is 
not a good idea for a secured party to lose or misplace the debtor’s 
collateral pledge/UCC security agreement, which is what occurred 
in Bozorg,82 or to lose or misplace the obligor’s hand note, which 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. § 9:5551(B). See also id. § 10:9-313(d). 
 80. See Nathan & Marshall, supra note 20, at 508 (supporting this more 
extreme position and postulating as to the legal consequences of a pledged 
collateral mortgage note being allowed to prescribe in five years as provided in 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3498). Nathan and Marshall concluded that, should 
enforcement of the pledged collateral mortgage note become barred, the collateral 
mortgage would become “virtually worthless.” Id. See also Kaplan v. Univ. Lake 
Corp., 381 So. 2d 385, 390–91 (La. 1979); McGill v. Thigpen, 780 So. 2d 1224, 
1228 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
 81. See Gutierrez v. Baldridge, 105 So. 3d 156 (La. Ct. App. 2011). In 
Gutierrez, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal refused to permit the 
secured party to foreclose under a collateral mortgage when the secured party 
was unable to produce the original signed collateral mortgage note, which 
apparently was lost or misplaced. The Louisiana Third Circuit did not, however, 
directly address the question raised within as to whether the fact that the secured 
party somehow lost or misplaced the collateral mortgage note had the effect of 
rendering the mortgage ineffective as against third persons, the debtor, and as a 
lien and encumbrance on the mortgaged property. See supra Parts I.D.4, II.E 
(discussing Gutierrez). 
 82. Tex. Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667, 673–75 (La. 1984). 
The assignee bank in Bozorg (Texas Bank of Beaumont or “TBB”) was unable 
to produce Bozorg’s original signed collateral pledge agreement and thereby 
was unable to convince the court that the parties intended that Bozorg’s pledged 
collateral mortgage note and accessory collateral mortgage would not only 
secure any and all present and future loans that Bozorg might obtain from the 
originating lender (First Metropolitan Bank or “FMB”), but also that Bozorg’s 
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is what occurred in Alaska Southern Partners v. Baxley,83 discussed 
in Part II.C of this Article.  
4. Future Advance Priority Rights of Post-1989 Collateral 
Mortgages84  
The future advance, retroactive priority rights of post-1989 
Louisiana collateral mortgages are derived from the interaction of 
Louisiana UCC section 9-204(c),85 section 9-322(a)(1),86 and 
section 9-323(a),87 with sections 5551(A)88 and 5551(B)89 of the 
Louisiana collateral mortgage statute. These statutes, when read in 
                                                                                                             
 
pledged note and accessory mortgage additionally would secure any and all future 
loans that Bozorg may subsequently obtain from FMB’s successors and assigns; in 
this case TBB which had acquired Bozorg’s loans from FMB. See Willenzik, 
Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 20–21, 24–25 (discussing 
Bozorg). 
 83. 799 So. 2d 680 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
 84. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 37–38 
(discussing retroactive priority rules that applied to post-1989 Louisiana collateral 
mortgages under the original 1990 version of Louisiana UCC Article 9). 
 85. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-204(c) (2002) (providing that a UCC 
security interest may secure future loan advances and other cross-collateralized 
indebtedness, whether or not given pursuant to a commitment).  
 86. Id. § 10:9-322(a)(1) (providing the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule of 
UCC Article 9: “Conflicting perfected security interests . . . rank according to 
priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earlier of the time 
a filing covering the collateral is first made or the security interest . . . is first 
perfected, if there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor 
perfection.”). 
 87.  Id. § 10:9-323(a). See also id. § 10:9-312(7) (providing that, if and 
when future advances are made while a UCC security interest remains perfected 
by filing or possession, the security interest is deemed to secure future advances 
to the same degree and extent as it secures the initial loan or advance).  
 88. Id. § 9:5551(A) (“A collateral mortgage becomes effective as to third 
parties, subject to the requirements of registry of the collateral mortgage, when a 
security interest is perfected in the obligation secured by the collateral mortgage 
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial 
Laws.” (citations omitted)). 
 89. Id. § 9:5551(B) (“A collateral mortgage takes its rank and priority from 
the time it becomes effective as to third parties. Once it becomes effective, as 
long as the effects of recordation continues in accordance with Articles 3328 
through 3334 of the Civil Code, a collateral mortgage remains effective as to 
third parties (notwithstanding any intermediate period when the security interest 
in the secured obligation becomes unperfected) as long as the secured party or 
his agent or his successor retains possession of the collateral mortgage note or 
other written obligation, or the obligation secured by the mortgage otherwise 
remains enforceable according to its terms, by the secured party or his 
successor.”). 
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conjunction with one another, permit post-1989 UCC possessory 
security interests in pledged collateral mortgages, notes, and 
accessory collateral mortgages to secure future advances and other 
cross-collateralized debt on a retroactive ranking priority basis 
back to the time the mortgage originally was recorded in the parish 
mortgage records, or the time that the secured party’s UCC 
security interest in the pledged note became fully perfected, 
whichever is the last to occur.90 This assumes and is subject to the 
provisos that (1) the debtor’s UCC security agreement contains 
expansive future advance, cross-collateralization language,91 (2) 
the secured party initially gives value either by funding the secured 
loan or committing to do so at a later date,92 (3) the secured party 
retains physical possession of the original, signed collateral 
mortgage note at all pertinent times,93 (4) the balance of the 
secured indebtedness is not reduced to $0.00 when there is no 
forward commitment to extend additional credit,94 (5) the parties at 
all times act in good faith,95 (6) the ten year inscription period of 
the mortgage has not been allowed to lapse,96 and (7) the collateral 
mortgage note has not been allowed to prescribe in five years and 
thereby become unenforceable.97 All seven of the foregoing conditions 
                                                                                                             
 90. The source of this conclusion of law is the interaction between the 
Louisiana collateral mortgage statute and the pertinent provisions of Louisiana 
UCC Article 9. Note the change in the law that occurred in 1990. Pre-1990 
collateral mortgages became effective and took their ranking priority from the 
date of recordation, or the date that the collateral mortgage note was delivered in 
pledge, whichever was the last to occur. By way of comparison, post-1989 
collateral mortgages become effective and take their ranking priority from the 
later of the recordation date, or the day that the secured party’s UCC security 
interest in the pledged note becomes fully perfected. UCC perfection requires 
more than mere delivery of the collateral mortgage note to the secured party or 
its collateral agent. Specifically, the secured party must give value by either 
funding the loan or issuing a binding commitment to lend at a future date. See 
id. § 10:9-203(b)(1); see also id. § 10:1-204 (definition of value).  
 91. The proper place to include future advance/cross-collateralization 
language is in the debtor’s collateral pledge or UCC security agreement rather than 
in the collateral mortgage agreement. See Tex. Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 
So. 2d 667, 675 n.10 (La. 1984). 
 92. See discussion supra Part I.D.6 (regarding a delayed, anticipatory credit 
situation).  
 93. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5551(B) (2007).  
 94. See discussion supra Part I.D.5 (regarding a lapsed credit situation).  
 95. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1759, 1983 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-
302(b) (Supp. 2015) (requiring that every contract be performed in good faith). 
 96. A collateral mortgage must be reinscribed every ten years in order to 
remain effective against third persons. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3357 (2015). 
 97. As a demand promissory note, a collateral mortgage note will prescribe, 
and thereby become unenforceable under Louisiana Civil Code article 3498, if 
not reacknowledged every five years. This reacknowledgement requirement 
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must remain satisfied at all pertinent times in order for future advances 
to be entitled to retroactive ranking priority vis-à-vis competing third 
persons.98 
5. No Loss of Priority in Lapsed Credit Situations  
Section 5551(B) of the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute 
contains a very important provision that preserves the retroactive 
ranking priority of a collateral mortgage when, over an intermediate 
period, the balance of the secured indebtedness is reduced to $0.00 
and there then is no forward commitment on the part of the secured 
party to extend additional credit. This circumstance is best described 
as a “lapsed credit” situation.99  
As a general rule, a possession-perfected UCC security interest 
in pledged collateral will secure future advances on a retroactive 
priority basis only so long as there is no intermediate period when 
the security interest ceases to be fully perfected.100 To explain, there 
                                                                                                             
 
applies only to collateral mortgage notes pledged to secure the debts of a third 
person, assuming that the debtor has not personally guaranteed the secured 
indebtedness. There is no comparable requirement that a debtor acknowledge a 
pledged collateral mortgage note every five years when the debtor is personally 
obligated on the secured debt either individually or with others. The constant 
acknowledgement rule applies under the latter circumstance. See Kaplan v. 
Univ. Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1979); see also Succession of Picard, 115 
So. 2d 817 (La. 1959); Scott v. Corkern, 91 So. 2d 569 (La. 1956); Michael H. 
Rubin & Stephen Strohchein, Developments in the Law 1993–1994-Security 
Devices, 55 LA. L. REV. 611, 636–38 (1995).  
 98. The source of this conclusion of law again is the interaction between the 
Louisiana collateral mortgage statute and the pertinent provisions of Louisiana 
UCC Article 9. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-312(7) (1990) (providing that, 
if and when a future advance is made while the security interest is fully 
perfected by filing or possession, the future advance is entitled to retroactive 
ranking priority back to the time of original perfection). The drafters of the 2001 
comprehensive revisions to UCC Article 9 chose not to continue former UCC 
section 9-312(7) under Revised UCC Article 9 because they felt that the same 
result is achieved under UCC section 9-204(c) (recognizing the ability of UCC 
security interest to secure future advances and cross-collateralized debt), and 
under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of UCC section 9-322(a)(1). 
 99. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 39–42 
(discussing the lapsed credit rule that previously applied under the original 1990 
version of Louisiana UCC Article 9, and specifically under former Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 10:9-312(7) (1990)). 
 100. The lapsed credit rule applies to possession-perfected UCC security 
interests in pledged collateral, and does not apply to UCC security interest in non-
possessory goods (e.g., inventory and equipment) that are perfected by filing a 
UCC-1 financing statement in the public UCC records (filing perfection). This is 
as a result of application of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Louisiana Revised 
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are four requirements that must be satisfied in order for possession 
perfection to be complete under UCC Article 9: (1) the debtor must 
have rights in the collateral, meaning the right to encumber the 
collateral in favor of the secured party;101 (2) the secured party must 
give value,102 either by funding the secured indebtedness or issuing 
a binding loan commitment to advance funds to the debtor at a later 
date;103 (3) the debtor must enter into a UCC security agreement 
granting the secured party a UCC security interest in the collateral to 
secure the secured indebtedness;104 and (4) the secured party must 
retain physical possession of the collateral at all pertinent times.105 If 
any one or more of these requirements ceases to be satisfied over an 
intermediate period, then future advances made by the secured party 
after the security interest once again becomes fully perfected are not 
entitled to retroactive ranking priority back to the date of original 
perfection, but instead re-rank only from the time the security 
interest re-perfects. To repeat, in a lapsed credit situation, a 
possessory security interest ceases to be fully perfected when the 
debtor pays the secured indebtedness in full and there then is no 
binding commitment on the part of the secured party to lend 
additional amounts to the debtor. The reason why is because the 
second requirement of perfection (that of giving value) is no longer 
satisfied. It then necessarily follows that additional advances that 
the secured party may make to the debtor after expiration of the 
lapsed credit period will be secured by the pledged collateral with 
ranking priority only back to the time the security interest once 
again becomes fully perfected.106 
                                                                                                             
 
Statutes section 10:9-322(a)(1). The first secured party to file or otherwise perfect 
a UCC security interest in collateral has priority over competing third persons who 
may later file or perfect a UCC security interest in the same collateral. The reason 
why the lapsed credit rule does not apply to file-perfected UCC security interests 
is because a file-perfected security interest maintains its first-in-time priority status 
notwithstanding any initial or intermediate period when there is no outstanding 
secured debt, and there is no commitment to lend funds to debtor at a later date. 
The filing part of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule does not require that the security 
interest be fully perfected, but only that the secured party file a UCC-1 financing 
statement in the UCC records. 
 101. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-203(b)(2) (2002); UCC § 9-203 cmt. 6 
(2010).  
 102. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-204 (Supp. 2015) (defining the term 
“value”). 
 103. See id. § 10:9-203(b)(1). 
 104. See id. § 10:9-203(b)(3). 
 105. See id. § 10:9-313. 
 106. Id. § 10:9-322(a)(1) (discussing the application of the first-to-file-or-
perfect rule); UCC § 9-322 cmt. 4 (2010). 
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The following example illustrates this rather confusing UCC 
Article 9 rule: 
Facts: A borrower (Debtor) obtains a $1 million loan from 
SP1 (a lender specializing in lending to fine art collectors) 
secured by the pledge of Debtor’s valuable collection of listed 
Picasso sketches, which Debtor holds for personal investment 
purposes. Debtor’s UCC security agreement contains cross-
collateralization language under which Debtor agrees that the 
pledged sketches will not only secure the $1 million loan, but 
also secure any and all other present and future loans that 
Debtor may obtain from SP1. Debtor delivers the original 
Picasso sketches to SP1’s collateral agent (a bonded art 
storage/vault facility) on January 5, thus completing 
perfection. Three months later (on April 5), Debtor prepays 
the $1 million loan in full, but allows SP1’s collateral agent to 
hold on to the possessory collateral. Two months after that (on 
June 5), Debtor obtains a $500,000 loan from SP2 (a different 
lender) secured by the same Picasso sketches. SP2 has the 
option under UCC Article 9 of perfecting its security interest 
in the art collateral by filing a UCC financing statement or by 
taking possession.107 SP2 elects to file perfect only without 
attempting to take possession.108 SP2 files a UCC-1 financing 
statement on June 5. The filed financing statement lists the 
Picasso sketches in great detail. Debtor later (on September 5) 
obtains a second $750,000 loan from SP1. 
 
Question 1: Is SP1’s subsequent September 5, $750,000 loan 
to Debtor secured by a UCC pledge of Debtor’s Picasso 
sketches remaining in SP1’s constructive possession, and is 
SP1’s security interest perfected at the time the subsequent 
$750,000 loan is made and funded on September 5? Answer: 
Yes to both questions because Debtor’s original UCC security 
agreement contained future advance/cross-collaterization 
language and SP1’s collateral agent continued to retain 
possession of the pledged sketches at all pertinent times. 
SP1’s security interest was originally perfected on January 5, 
                                                                                                             
 107. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-310(a), 9-313(a) (2002). A secured 
party may perfect a UCC security interest in investment art either by filing a 
UCC-1 financing statement or by taking possession. Id. 
 108. Investment art is classified for UCC purposes as consumer goods when 
held by an individual for personal investment purposes. By way of comparison, 
the same art collection is classified as inventory for UCC purposes when held by 
an art dealer for resale purposes. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102(a)(23), 
(48) (2002). 
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and then became unperfected on April 5 at the time the first 
SP1 $1 million loan was prepaid in full because value was no 
longer given. SP1’s security interest reperfected on September 
5 at the time the subsequent $750,000 loan was made and 
funded. 
 
Question 2: Does SP1’s possession-perfected UCC security 
interest in the possessory collateral outrank SP2’s later-in-
time, file-perfected security interest as a result of the first-to-
file-or-perfect rule of UCC 9-322(a)(1)? Answer: No, not 
under these facts because, when Debtor paid off the original 
$1 million loan on April 5 with no forward commitment on 
the part of SP1 to extend additional credit, SP1 was no 
longer fully perfected as a result of a failure to give present 
value. At that moment, SP2’s later-in-time file-perfected 
security interest in the common collateral jumped ahead of 
SP1’s first-in-time, possessory security interest because SP1 
was no longer fully perfected despite the fact that SP1 
continued to possess the original pledged art. Although 
SP1’s security interest reperfected on September 5 when 
SP1 made the subsequent $750,000 loan to Debtor, SP1 had 
already lost its place in line (priority) to SP2’s now priming 
file-perfected UCC security interest in the common 
collateral.109  
Section 5551(B) of the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute 
alters the above result by providing that the lien of a Louisiana 
collateral mortgage (actually the UCC pledge of the collateral 
mortgage note)110 retains its original retroactive ranking priority 
“notwithstanding any intermediate period when the security 
interest in the secured obligation [the pledged collateral mortgage 
note] becomes unperfected.”111 
Facts: Assume the same basic facts with the exception that 
Debtor’s January 5, $1 million loan is secured by the pledge 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. § 10:9-322(a)(1) (applying the first-to-file-or-perfect rule). SP2 filed 
a UCC-1 financing statement on June 5 before SP1’s possession-perfected UCC 
security in the pledged art reperfected on September 5. 
 110. The primary security interest in a collateral mortgage arrangement is the 
UCC pledge of the collateral mortgage note. The collateral mortgage follows the 
pledged note as a secondary, accessory security interest. See id. §§ 10:9-109(b), 
10:9-308(d). Consequently, when Louisiana Revised Statues section 9:5551(B) 
refers to the lien of a Louisiana collateral mortgage, the statute really is referring 
to the UCC future advance/retroactive priority rights of that flow out of the UCC 
pledge of the collateral mortgage note. See id. § 9:5551(B).  
 111. Id. § 9:5551(B). 
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of a Louisiana collateral note and accessory collateral 
mortgage. SP1 records the mortgage and takes delivery of 
the collateral mortgage note in pledge on January 5. On 
April 5, Debtor prepays the SP1 $1 million loan in full with 
no forward commitment to lend additional funds. Debtor 
does not require SP1 to cancel the mortgage and SP1 holds 
on to the pledged collateral mortgage note. On June 5, 
Debtor obtains a $500,000 loan from SP2, which is secured 
by a second collateral mortgage on the same property. SP2 
records its mortgage and takes possession of the pledged 
note on June 5. On September 5, SP1 makes a new $750,000 
loan to Debtor. 
 
Question 1: Is SP1’s subsequent September 5, $750,000 loan 
secured by the Debtor’s still outstanding collateral mortgage? 
Answer: Yes, so long as (i) the mortgage was not cancelled or 
released, (ii) Debtor’s original UCC security agreement 
contained expansive cross-collateralization language, and (iii) 
the pledged collateral mortgage note remained in SP1’s 
possession at all pertinent times. 
 
Question 2: Does the fact that SP1 did not maintain full 
perfection over the intermediate, lapsed credit period (i.e., 
from April 5 until September 5) somehow result in a 
reordering of priority of SP1’s first-in-time collateral 
mortgage vis-à-vis SP2’s later-in-time collateral mortgage as 
a result of the first-to-file-or-perfect/lapsed credit rule 
discussed in the first example above? Answer: No, because 
section 5551(B) of the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute 
modifies the otherwise applicable UCC first-to-file-or-
perfect priority rule by providing that the lien of a Louisiana 
collateral mortgage (actually the pledge of the collateral 
mortgage note) does not lose its retroactive ranking priority 
notwithstanding any intermediate period when the security 
interest in the pledged note ceases to be fully perfected. 
6. Effectiveness of a Collateral Mortgage in a Delayed, 
Anticipatory Credit Situation When There is No 
Contemporaneous Loan or Forward Commitment to Lend at a 
Later Date  
A related issue is whether a post-1989 collateral mortgage is 
effective and takes its initial ranking priority vis-à-vis third persons 
when the mortgage is granted in anticipation that the debtor might 
someday obtain a loan from the secured party without there being a 
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present, binding forward commitment to lend at a future date. This 
circumstance is best described as a delayed, anticipatory credit 
situation.112  
Sections 5551(A) and 5551(B) of the Louisiana collateral 
mortgage statute provide that a collateral mortgage becomes 
effective and takes its ranking priority vis-à-vis third persons from 
the time the mortgage is recorded in the public mortgage records, or 
the time that the secured party’s UCC security interest in the 
pledged note becomes fully perfected, whichever is the last to occur. 
One of the four requirements of perfection of the pledged collateral 
mortgage note is that the secured party must give value, meaning 
that the secured party must either initially fund the loan or issue a 
binding forward commitment to advance funds to the debtor at a 
later date. In a delayed, anticipatory credit situation, there is no 
initial loan or loan advance, and there is no binding forward 
commitment to lend at a future time. There is only an anticipation 
that one day the debtor might obtain a loan from the secured party 
or its successor or assignee secured by the pledge of the collateral 
mortgage note. This means that there is no present giving of value, 
and no present perfection of a UCC security interest in the pledged 
note, in the absence of which the debtor’s collateral mortgage 
cannot become effective and take its ranking priority vis-à-vis third 
persons. This is the result despite the fact that the debtor’s 
collateral mortgage may have been properly recorded in the public 
mortgage records.113 
The following example illustrates this easily confused rule: 
Facts: ABC wishes to construct a commercial office 
building on land that ABC already owns. ABC applies to 
Bank for a $5,000,000 construction loan, which is still in 
the application stage and which is yet to be approved. For 
good reason, ABC feels it is necessary to immediately start 
construction before Bank passes on (approves or denies) 
ABC’s loan application. Acting on advice of counsel and at 
Bank’s request, ABC grants Bank a collateral mortgage on 
the land and the improvements to be constructed. The 
                                                                                                             
 112. The 1994 Willenzik Article did not discuss the delayed, anticipatory 
credit perfection issues discussed in this Part.  
 113. Ordinary conventional mortgages and multiple indebtedness mortgages 
become effective and take their ranking priority vis-à-vis competing third persons 
from the time the mortgage is recorded in the parish mortgage records. See LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3338 (2015). By way of comparison, collateral mortgages become 
effective and take their ranking priority from the time the mortgage is recorded, or 
the time the secured party’s UCC security interest in the pledged collateral 
mortgage note is fully perfected, whichever is the last to occur.  
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stated reason why this was done is to result in Bank’s 
mortgage having priority over potentially competing 
contractor and supplier liens under the Louisiana Private 
Works Act114 should Bank subsequently approve and fund 
ABC’s loan. ABC’s mortgage, collateral mortgage note, 
and UCC security agreement are each dated May 1. The 
original signed collateral mortgage note was delivered to 
Bank and the mortgage was properly recorded on the same 
day. Construction work commenced on May 15, 15 days 
after Bank’s mortgage was recorded. After some delay due 
to ABC’s failure to produce financial information, Bank 
approved the loan and issued a binding loan commitment on 
July 15. The loan was not funded until August 1. ABC 
subsequently defaulted under the loan and declared 
bankruptcy before the construction was completed. Two 
adverse claimants assert competing claims in the bankruptcy 
case: (i) XYZ, a subcontractor, asserting a privilege as a 
result of non-payment of amounts owed to XYZ for work 
performed, and (ii) the Internal Revenue Service, asserting 
that the IRS filed a tax lien against ABC and its properties 
on June 1—31 days after Bank’s mortgage was recorded. 
 
Question 1: Who has priority: XYZ, an unpaid 
subcontractor, or Bank, which recorded its mortgage on May 
1 before commencement of work on the project? Answer: 
XYZ asserting a subcontractor’s lien notwithstanding the 
fact that Bank’s collateral mortgage was recorded 15 days 
before construction work commenced. Reason: Section 
4821(A)(3) of the Louisiana Private Works Act115 provides 
that real estate construction mortgages are entitled to priority 
over the competing claims of contractors, subcontractors, 
suppliers, and others (with the exception of certain tax liens 
and claims of unpaid laborers) only if such mortgages 
become effective against third persons before work on the 
project commences.116 As a general rule, a mortgage is 
effective and takes its ranking priority against competing 
third persons from the time the mortgage is recorded in the 
                                                                                                             
 114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (2007) (enacted by Act No. 724, 1981 
La. Acts 1400). 
 115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(A)(3) (2002). 
 116. See Michael H. Rubin, Ruminations on the Louisiana Private Works 
Act, 58 LA. L. REV. 569, 608 (1998) (“[If] a mortgage or privilege on immovable 
property is effective [as against third persons] before . . . ‘work’ begins, it will 
outrank all lien claimants except . . . ad valorem taxes and local assessments . . . 
and [claims of unpaid] laborers.”).  
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parish mortgage records.117 This general rule, however, 
applies only to ordinary conventional mortgages and to 
multiple indebtedness mortgages and does not apply to 
collateral mortgages, which become effective and take their 
ranking priority vis-à-vis third persons from the time the 
mortgage is recorded of record, or the time that the secured 
party’s UCC security interest in the pledged collateral 
mortgage note becomes fully perfected, whichever is last to 
occur. If and when a construction collateral mortgage is 
recorded prior to initial funding of the loan, or before the 
issuance of a binding forward commitment, there is no 
present giving of value, meaning that the UCC pledge of 
the debtor’s collateral mortgage note is not fully perfected 
until a later uncertain date. It then necessarily follows that 
Bank’s construction collateral mortgage would not be 
entitled to ranking priority ahead of competing contractor, 
subcontractor, and supplier claims notwithstanding the fact 
that Bank’s mortgage was recorded prior to commencement 
of work on the project. For this reason, collateral mortgages 
should not be used in construction financings when there is 
delayed initial funding or no loan commitment.118  
 
Question 2: Who has priority: the IRS filing a tax lien 
against ABC and its assets on June 1, or Bank under its May 
1 collateral mortgage? Answer: The IRS will have priority 
over Bank even though the IRS filed its tax lien on June 1—
31 days after Bank recorded its mortgage. Although Bank’s 
collateral mortgage was recorded on May 1, the mortgage 
did not become effective against third persons, including the 
IRS, until July 15 when Bank approved the loan and issued 
a binding loan commitment, and thus gave value. At that 
moment in time (July 15), Bank’s UCC security interest in 
the pledged collateral mortgage note became fully perfected, 
and Bank’s May 1 collateral mortgage first became effective 
against third persons (including the IRS). As such, the IRS’s 
later-in-time (June 1) federal tax lien was entitled to ranking 
priority head of Bank’s earlier-in-time (May 1) recorded 
collateral mortgage. 
 
Question 3: Would the result be the same if these same 
facts occurred in 1989 before Louisiana UCC Article 9 and 
the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute first took effect on 
                                                                                                             
 117. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3307(3) (2015). 
 118. See also supra Part IV.B.4. 
642 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
January 1, 1990? Answer: No, the result would have been 
different. There was no requirement under the previously 
applicable 1870 Civil Code pledge articles that a secured 
party initially fund a loan or loan advance or issue a binding 
commitment to lend at a future date in order for a pre-1990 
Civil Code pledge of a collateral mortgage note and accessory 
collateral mortgage to become effective and take its ranking 
priority vis-à-vis competing third persons. The giving of value 
is a UCC-imposed requirement that did not apply to pre-1990 
pledges of collateral mortgage notes and accessory collateral 
mortgages.119 
 
Question 4: Would the result be different if Bank’s 
construction loan had been secured by a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage rather than a collateral mortgage? Answer: Yes, for 
the reasons more fully discussed in Part III.C of this Article.  
II. SIGNIFICANT COLLATERAL MORTGAGE CASE LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1994 
What follows is a discussion of significant Louisiana collateral 
mortgage cases decided since 1994 that apply to post-1989 collateral 
mortgages subject to Louisiana UCC Article 9 and the Louisiana 
collateral mortgage statute. 
A. Diamond Services Corporation v. Benoit 
The most significant collateral mortgage case decided in the past 
20 years is Diamond Services Corp. v. Benoit,120 in which the 
Louisiana Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a third-party 
collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note somehow imposed 
                                                                                                             
 119. See People’s Bank & Trust Co. v. Campbell, 374 So. 2d 741, 743–44 (La. 
Ct. App. 1979). In Campbell, the Third Circuit was faced with an anticipatory 
credit situation incident to a pre-1990 collateral mortgage. Id. at 742. The court 
upheld the effectiveness of the pledge and mortgage based on statement of intent 
language included in the debtor’s collateral mortgage agreement to the effect that 
the debtor was mortgaging his property to secure any and all present and future 
indebtedness of the debtor to the secured party. Id. at 744. Note that the Third 
Circuit’s holding in Campbell applies only to pre-1990 pledges of collateral 
mortgage notes subject to the pledge articles of the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code and 
has no applicability to post-1989 collateral mortgages subject to Louisiana UCC 
Article 9 and the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute, which require that there be 
an initial loan advance or commitment to lend as preconditions of a collateral 
mortgage becoming effective as against third persons. See also Willenzik, Future 
Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 15. 
 120. 780 So. 2d 367 (La. 2001).  
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personal (in personam) liability on a third-party mortgagor/debtor 
granting the mortgage on the debtor’s property to secure the 
indebtedness of another person, when the mortgagor/debtor did not 
otherwise agree to personally guarantee the secured mortgage debt.121 
1. Facts and Disposition 
The facts of Benoit are relatively straightforward. In 1993, 
William Davenport obtained separate loans from Morgan City Bank 
(MCB) and Diamond Services Corp. The MCB loan was secured by 
a third-party collateral mortgage and UCC pledge of a collateral 
mortgage note granted by Delores Benoit, a business associate of 
Davenport. The Diamond Services loan was secured by Benoit’s 
separate third-party collateral mortgage encumbering Benoit’s other 
property. Davenport subsequently defaulted under both the MCB 
loan and the Diamond Services loan. MCB later sold/assigned 
Davenport’s defaulted MCB loan to Diamond Services, and 
Diamond Services commenced foreclosure under both loans and 
mortgages.122 The mortgaged properties eventually were sold at a 
judicial foreclosure sale, resulting in a deficiency balance owed. 
Diamond Services then filed suit against Benoit claiming that, by 
signing the two collateral mortgage notes, Benoit became personally 
liable to MCB and Diamond Services notwithstanding the fact that 
Benoit never cosigned Davenport’s hand notes or executed a 
separate written guaranty agreement guaranteeing payment.123 
Benoit objected to Diamond Services’ claim, asserting that it was 
never her intent or agreement to assume personal liability for 
Davenport’s loans. The trial court held in Benoit’s favor, and 
Diamond Services appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of 
Appeal.124  
2. The Third Circuit’s Decision in Benoit  
The Third Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision, holding 
that, as maker of the two collateral mortgage notes, Benoit was 
                                                                                                             
 121. See Jason R. Johanson, Diamond Services Corp. v. Benoit: The Louisiana 
Supreme Court Limits Liability for the Third-Party Maker of a Collateral 
Mortgage Note, 76 TUL. L. REV. 819 (2002). Several other sources have discussed 
the personal liability issue. See Rubin, 1978–1979 Term, supra note 24, at 581–83; 
Nathan & Dunbar, supra note 43, at 43–45; Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 97, at 
639. 
 122. Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Benoit, 757 So. 2d 23, 25 (La. Ct. App. 1999), 
rev’d, 780 So. 2d 367 (La. 2001); Benoit, 780 So. 2d at 369–70. 
 123. Benoit, 780 So. 2d at 369–70. 
 124. Benoit, 757 So. 2d at 25. 
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personally liable to Diamond Services for up to the $650,000 
combined collateral mortgage note amounts, notwithstanding that 
Benoit had never agreed to be personally obligated on Davenport’s 
debt to MCB and to Diamond Services. As stated by the court, 
“[t]his circuit has been consistent in holding that a third party maker 
of a collateral mortgage note, pledged to secure the indebtedness of 
another, will be held personally liable.”125 The Third Circuit cited its 
prior decision in Concordia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lowry126 as 
authority, in which the court concluded:  
[While] it is established that the hand note is the debt 
instrument in a collateral mortgage arrangement, it is equally 
clear that the maker of the collateral mortgage note is 
personally liable thereon. A collateral mortgage note . . .  is 
a negotiable instrument. The mere fact that it is paraphed for 
identification with a collateral mortgage does not alter its 
nature or effect. Accordingly, the collateral mortgage note 
creates a personal obligation for which the maker is liable. 
It therefore follows that even though the debt is incurred in 
connection with the hand note in a collateral mortgage 
arrangement, the maker of the collateral mortgage note is 
personally liable for the indebtedness owed. However, such 
personal liability is limited to the lesser of the face amount 
of the collateral mortgage note and the amount owed in 
connection with the hand note.127 
3. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision in Benoit  
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in order to resolve 
a split in the circuits between the Third Circuit’s decision in Benoit 
and the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in Bank of New Orleans & 
Trust Co. v. H.P.B. Jr. Development Co.,128 in which the Fifth 
Circuit held that a third-party maker of a collateral mortgage note 
has no personal liability when the note is pledged to secure the 
debt of another person.129 In a flawed opinion, the Supreme Court 
concluded in Benoit that:  
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. at 27. 
 126. 533 So. 2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 539 So. 2d 
46 (La. 1989). See also Bank of Lafayette v. Bailey, 531 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 127. Concordia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lowry, 533 So. 2d 170, 172–73 (La. Ct. 
App. 1988) (emphasis added). 
 128. 427 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 129. See also Commercial Nat’l Bank v. Succession of Rodgers, 628 So. 2d 
33, 36–37 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the maker of a third-party collateral 
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[T]he maker of a collateral mortgage note, paraphed ne 
varietur for identification with the act of collateral mortgage, 
is not personally liable beyond the value of the mortgaged 
property when the collateral mortgage note is pledged to 
secure the debt of a third party, absent some additional 
agreement so binding the maker of the collateral mortgage 
note.130 
Personal or in personam liability necessarily means that the 
secured mortgage debt can be satisfied out of any and all of the 
third-party mortgagor’s assets without the secured party’s default 
remedies being limited solely to recourse foreclosure against the 
mortgaged property as would be the result in the case of an in rem 
mortgage.131 The following examples illustrate this point.  
Example 1: Debtor grants an ordinary conventional mortgage 
in favor of SP to secure a $100,000 mortgage note for which 
Debtor is personally obligated as maker. Debtor defaults 
under the loan and note and SP accelerates payment. Under 
these facts, SP has the option of foreclosing under the 
mortgage and causing the mortgaged property to be seized 
and sold at judicial foreclosure sale. If the proceeds of the 
judicial sale are not sufficient to fully satisfy the mortgage 
debt, Debtor remains personally liable for any resulting 
deficiency, which can be satisfied out of the Debtor’s other 
assets. Under this example, SP also has the option of 
foregoing foreclosure and initially suing Debtor to collect 
the amount owed under the mortgage note. 
 
Example 2: Debtor grants a third-party ordinary conventional 
mortgage in favor of SP to secure ABC’s loan and note. 
Debtor does not agree to personally guarantee ABC’s loan. 
ABC defaults and SP forecloses against the mortgaged 
property. The property is sold at a judicial sale with the sale 
proceeds being insufficient to fully satisfy ABC’s mortgage 
debt. Under these facts, as compared to Example 1 above, 
Debtor is not personally liable on the debt and cannot be 
                                                                                                             
 
mortgage note is personally liable to the mortgagee only up to the value of the 
mortgaged property). 
 130. Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Benoit, 780 So. 2d 367, 382 (La. 2001). 
 131. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3182 (1870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133 (2015) 
(enacted under Act No. 281, §1, 2014 La. Acts, effective Jan. 1, 2015) 
(“Whoever is personally bound for an obligation is obligated to fulfill it out of 
all of his property, movable and immovable, present and future.”). 
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held liable to pay the deficiency balance remaining owed. 
 
Example 3: Assume the same facts as Example 2 above 
except that Debtor’s mortgage is in the form of a collateral 
mortgage. Debtor signs a collateral mortgage note, a collateral 
pledge/UCC security agreement, and a collateral mortgage 
encumbering Debtor’s property. Debtor pledges the collateral 
mortgage note to SP to secure ABC’s loan. Debtor does not 
cosign or agree to personally guarantee ABC’s loan. ABC 
subsequently defaults and SP forecloses against Debtor’s 
mortgaged property, with the judicial sale proceeds being 
insufficient to fully pay and satisfy ABC’s debt.  
The question presented before the Supreme Court in Benoit was 
whether Diamond Services (the SP in Example 3 above) could 
attempt to hold Benoit (the Debtor) personally liable for the resulting 
deficiency solely as a result of Benoit signing the collateral mortgage 
note, with Diamond Services then seeking to satisfy the deficiency 
amount owed out of Benoit’s other assets. The Supreme Court held 
that Benoit was in fact personally liable to Diamond Services as a 
result of Benoit signing the collateral mortgage note, subject to the 
caveat that Benoit’s personal liability was limited to the value of the 
mortgaged property, whatever that amount may be.132 
4. Critique of Benoit  
The Supreme Court’s in personam holding in Benoit is flawed in 
the following respects.  
First, a collateral mortgage note is not a real note. It does not and 
never is intended to evidence any indebtedness of the maker in favor 
of the named secured party or any other future holder or holders of 
the pledged note. In truth and in fact, a collateral mortgage note is a 
legal fiction, a contrivance intended solely to serve as collateral to 
secure payment of the obligor’s true secured indebtedness evidenced 
by one or more hand notes. Nathan and Marshall were correct when 
they twice concluded in their landmark article, The Collateral 
Mortgage: 
The collateral mortgage note, i.e., the “ne varietur” note, is not 
the indebtedness; it is merely the security that will be pledged 
                                                                                                             
 132. See discussion infra note 147 (questioning how the value of the 
mortgaged property is determined when the mortgagee by-passes the mortgage 
foreclosure process, and initially elects to sue the mortgagee on a personal 
liability basis to collect payment on the collateral mortgage note).  
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as collateral for the true debt.133  In the collateral 
mortgage situation, the “ne varietur” note is not the 
indebtedness at all; the “ne varietur” note, rather, is only 
to be used as collateral, the security that is pledged to the 
creditor to secure another note. The true indebtedness is 
the debt that the collateral mortgage “ne varietur” note is 
pledged to secure. Thus, while the “ne varietur” note is 
generally a note payable on demand, it does not represent 
a specific debt.134  
The Supreme Court failed to recognize that, in a third-party 
collateral mortgage arrangement, no funds are ever advanced or 
intended to be advanced to the debtor evidenced by the pledged 
collateral mortgage note, and no indebtedness is ever incurred or 
intended to be incurred thereunder.135 As a general rule of law, a 
promissory note evidences the indebtedness of the maker to the 
note holder only to the extent that funds are actually advanced and 
owed thereunder. If no funds are ever advanced under a note, no 
indebtedness is ever created that will trigger in personam liability 
on the part of the maker.136 
Second, the Supreme Court’s in personam holding in Benoit is 
inconsistent with the Court’s prior pronouncement in Bozorg that a 
collateral mortgage note represents “a fictitious debt that can be 
pledged as collateral security for the real debt.”137 The Supreme 
Court further concluded in Alford that a collateral mortgage note is 
“not a debt instrument but a security device, a pledge instrument.”138 
If, as stated by the Supreme Court in Bozorg, and again in Alford, a 
collateral mortgage note is a legal fiction and is not a “debt 
instrument,” then how can a collateral mortgage note confer in 
personam liability on the maker solely as a result of signing a 
fictitious note under which no funds are ever borrowed or ever 
owed to the secured party? 
                                                                                                             
 133. Nathan & Marshall, supra note 20, at 502. 
 134. Id. at 505.  
 135. In a collateral mortgage situation, the borrower borrows funds, and the 
lender lends under the hand note(s). The debtor never borrows any funds, and 
the lender never lends under the collateral mortgage note, which again is a legal 
contrivance/security instrument that never is intended to evidence the borrower’s 
obligation to repay any specific indebtedness.  
 136. By way of example, ABC executes a $10,000 promissory note payable 
to the order of XYZ. XYZ commits to, but never advances funds to ABC under 
the note. Under these facts, ABC never owes any money to XYZ under the note 
or otherwise, and ABC does not incur personal liability simply by executing the 
note and delivering it to XYZ.  
 137. Tex. Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667, 671 (La. 1984).  
 138. First Guaranty Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299, 1303 (La. 1978).  
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Third, an additional argument can be made that a collateral 
mortgage granted to secure the debt of a third person gives rise to 
an in rem only obligation on the part of the mortgagor that is 
enforceable solely by foreclosing against the mortgaged property.139 
This argument is based on the black letter language of Civil Code 
article 3295 (mortgage securing another’s obligation),140 and the 
Louisiana State Law Institute’s 1991 Revision Comment (a) thereto, 
which provide that the grant of a third-party mortgage to secure the 
debt of another does not give rise to in personam liability on the part 
of the mortgagor. This argument is further supported by the 
Louisiana State Law Institute’s 1991 Revision Comment (b) to Civil 
Code article 3297.141 “As is discussed more fully in the Expose des 
Motifs, a mortgage does not create personal liability on the part of 
the [mortgagor]142 for the principal obligation (whether or not it is 
his or that of a third person).”143 
Fourth, Diamond Services’ collection lawsuits against Benoit 
were subterfuges and must be viewed in the proper context.144 In 
truth and in fact, Diamond Services’ suits against Benoit were not 
attempts to collect payment under the pledged notes as independent 
debt instruments. Rather, the suits were disguised attempts by 
Diamond Services to collect from Benoit the deficiency balance that 
remained owed on Davenport’s loans after the judicial sales of the 
mortgaged properties, which Diamond Services otherwise was 
                                                                                                             
 139. An in rem mortgage, authorized under Louisiana Civil Code article 
3297, is a mortgage that can be satisfied solely by the exercise of default 
foreclosure remedies against the mortgaged property, without the mortgagor 
being personally liable for any resulting deficiency. See Max Nathan, The “In 
Rem” Mortgage, 44 TUL. L. REV. 497 (1970); see also Michael H. Rubin & E. 
Keith Carter, Notice of Seizure in Mortgage Foreclosures and Tax Sales: The 
Ramifications of Mennonite, 48 LA. L. REV. 535, 545 (1988); La. Nat’l Bank of 
Baton Rouge v. O’Brian, 439 So. 2d 552 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 140. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3295 (2015). 
 141. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3297 (2015). 
 142. The Louisiana State Law Institute 1991 Revision Comment (b) to 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3297 contains an obvious reference error, referring 
to the “mortgagee” when it clearly intends to refer to the “mortgagor.” See LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3297 cmt. b (2015). 
 143. A collateral mortgage is a mortgage within the context of Louisiana 
Civil Code articles 3295 and 3297, and the fact that the debtor signs a fictitious 
collateral mortgage note and delivers the note in pledge to the secured party 
should not change the in rem nature of the mortgage. 
 144. Diamond Services filed two separate collection lawsuits against Benoit; 
the first being a collection action filed in Acadia Parish seeking to enforce 
payment of the MCB pledged note, and the second being a separate collection 
action filed in Lafayette Parish seeking to collect payment on the Diamond 
Services pledged note. Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Benoit, 780 So. 2d 367, 369 
(La. 2001). 
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unable to collect from Davenport. Diamond Services sued Benoit in 
a secondary obligor capacity145 for the deficiency balance owed by 
Davenport in the same way that Diamond Services might have 
otherwise sued Benoit had she personally guaranteed Davenport’s 
loans.146 As the facts of the case demonstrate, Benoit never 
intended or agreed to personally guarantee Davenport’s loans, and 
the Court never should have allowed Diamond Services to assert a 
back-ended deficiency judgment claim against Benoit under the 
pretense of suing to independently collect payment of the pledged 
collateral mortgage notes. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Supreme Court clearly 
misspoke in Benoit when it concluded that Benoit was “personally 
liable” up to the value of the mortgaged property as a result of 
Benoit signing the two collateral mortgage notes at issue, and then 
pledging the notes to MCB and Diamond Services, respectively, to 
secure the debts of a third person (Davenport). Although a third-
party collateral mortgage admittedly has the effect of obligating 
the mortgagor on an in rem basis, a third-party collateral mortgage 
in no way imposes in personam liability on the mortgagor. 
5. Additional Comments 
Some might ask whether it makes any difference if a third-
party mortgagor like Benoit is liable on an in personam or on an in 
rem basis under a third-party collateral mortgage. Is the result not 
the same? To respond, it does make a difference. First, it is 
incorrect to say that a third-party mortgagor is personally liable on 
the debt for any amount. As stated in the Louisiana State Law 
Institute’s 1991 Revision Comment (a) to Civil Code article 3295 
and Revision Comment (b) to article 3297, a third-party mortgage 
is an in rem mortgage instrument, which does not, in and of itself, 
create personal liability on the part of the mortgagor. Second, the 
Supreme Court’s personal liability holding can lead to litigation 
abuse worse than that which occurred in Benoit when Diamond 
Services sued Benoit in a back-ended attempt to collect the 
deficiency balance that remained owed after the mortgaged 
                                                                                                             
 145. A guarantor or surety is obligated for payment of the principal obligor’s 
guaranteed indebtedness on a secondarily/derivative liability basis. See LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 3035–3037 (2015). 
 146. It is important to note that Davenport was the sole party contractually 
obligated to pay the deficiency balance that was still owed after the mortgaged 
properties were sold at judicial foreclosure sale. The fact that Benoit mortgaged 
her property to secure Davenport’s debts did not result in Benoit becoming 
personally obligated on the mortgage debt or for the deficiency balance remaining 
owed to Diamond Services.  
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properties were sold at judicial sale. If a third-party mortgagor 
such as Benoit can be held personally liable simply by executing a 
collateral mortgage note and delivering the note in pledge to the 
mortgagee, there would be nothing to prevent a mortgagee (such as 
Diamond Services) from bypassing the mortgage foreclosure 
process altogether and instead initially filing suit against the 
mortgagor to independently enforce payment of the pledged 
note.147 Nathan and Dunbar speculated to this effect in their article, 
The Collateral Mortgage: Logic and Experience:148 
But in the context of [a third-party mortgage] mortgaging 
property to secure someone else’s debts, the arrangements 
may be different. If the collateral mortgage were granted by 
S [a fictitious mortgagor] on Blackacre, and S pledged his 
collateral mortgage and collateral mortgage note to C [the 
mortgagee] to secure D’s [the third party obligor] debts, 
then C might well have a good reason to sue on the ne 
varietur note [rather than foreclosing under the mortgage]. 
It is axiomatic that a person may grant a mortgage on his 
property for the benefit of another. Suppose that . . . S 
granted a $100,000 mortgage on Blackacre and pledged the 
mortgage note to secure a $75,000 hand note given by D to 
C. Now further suppose that the value of Blackacre has 
declined and the property is worth only $50,000, less than 
the principal debt. C is not limited to enforcement of his 
personal obligation against D on the hand note, nor is he 
limited to foreclose of the mortgage on Blackacre. He has 
an additional remedy, for he may, if he chooses, sue S on 
the ne varietur note, which is . . . a separate negotiable 
instrument enforceable in accordance with its terms. Thus, 
in reality what has happened is that S has become a kind of 
surety for D. He has not merely exposed his immovable 
property, Blackacre, for D’s debt, but he is, in addition, 
personally liable on the ne varietur note.149  
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court ever intended to permit a 
mortgagee to initially file suit against a third-party mortgagor to 
                                                                                                             
 147. The Supreme Court held in Benoit that a third party mortgagor incurs 
personal liability under the pledged collateral mortgage note up to the value of 
the mortgaged property. Benoit, 780 So. 2d at 383. An open question remains: 
How is the value of the mortgaged property determined if and when the 
mortgagor by-passes the mortgage foreclosure process and initially sues the 
third party mortgagor to directly collect the pledged note? Is value determined 
based on the then appraised value of the property, or otherwise?  
 148. Nathan & Dunbar, supra note 43.  
 149. Id. at 43. 
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independently enforce payment on a pledged collateral mortgage 
note in lieu of foreclosing under the mortgage and having the 
mortgaged property seized and sold at judicial sale.150 As argued 
above, Civil Code articles 3295 and 3297 clearly provide that a 
third-party mortgage results in an in rem only obligation on the part 
of the mortgagor and does not subject the mortgagor to in personam 
liability, which—as demonstrated under the facts of Benoit—may be 
contrary to the mortgagor’s intent and agreement.151 This result is 
further contrary to Louisiana Civil Code article 3038,152 which 
provides that “[s]uretyship must be express and in writing.” The 
Louisiana State Law Institute’s 1987 Revision Comment (b) to 
article 3038 further explains: “It is sometimes doubtful whether an 
individual has guaranteed payment of another’s debt . . . . In such 
cases doubts are resolved against holding the individual as a surety 
on the theory that suretyship is a burden that one does not lightly 
undertake.” 
                                                                                                             
 150. The following example further illustrates the type of mortgagee abuse 
that is possible under this logical extension of the supreme court’s personal 
liability holding in Benoit: 
ABC borrows $1 million from Bank. ABC’s loan is secured by XYZ’s 
third-party collateral mortgage on XYZ’s property. ABC is a good 
customer of XYZ, and XYZ is persuaded to grant a third-party mortgage 
on XYZ’s property to keep ABC in business. XYZ does not agree to 
personally guarantee ABC’s loan and is verbally assured by Bank and 
Bank’s counsel that signing the collateral mortgage note will not result in 
XYZ becoming personally liable for payment of ABC’s indebtedness to 
Bank. XYZ signs a $5 million collateral mortgage note and delivers it in 
pledge to Bank. XYZ’s UCC pledge/agreement contains future 
advance/cross-collateralization language, and XYZ’s collateral mortgage 
contains a $50 million credit cap. The mortgaged XYZ property has a 
current appraised value of $10 million. ABC subsequently defaults and 
Bank considers what to do. At that time, XYZ has $5 million on deposit 
in its operating account with Bank, and Bank considers whether it can 
legally setoff what XYZ owes Bank under the XYZ $5 million pledged 
collateral mortgage note as an independent debt instrument against 
XYZ’s funds then on deposit with Bank. XYZ’s deposit account 
agreement with Bank contains contractual right of offset and grant of 
UCC security interest language, meaning that Bank has setoff rights 
under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 6:316. Bank elects to go the 
setoff route, which is an immediate remedy not requiring court approval 
or the procedural delays and complexity of judicial foreclosure against 
the XYZ mortgaged property. Bank offsets $1.35 million from XYZ’s 
deposit account to pay the $1 million defaulted loan, plus interest, costs, 
and 25% attorneys’ fees. XYZ vehemently objects and immediately files 
suit against Bank arguing that it was never XYZ’s intent or agreement to 
assume personal liability of ABC’s loan. Bank cites Benoit as authority.  
 151. Benoit repeatedly stated that she never intended nor agreed to personally 
guarantee Davenport’s debt. Benoit, 780 So. 2d at 369. 
 152. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3038 (2015).  
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6. Significance of Benoit  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Benoit, despite its flaws, is 
significant because of the Court’s judicial recognition that the 
pledge aspects of post-1989 collateral mortgages are now 
exclusively subject to Louisiana UCC Article 9 and are no longer 
subject to the pledge articles of the Louisiana Civil Code.153 The 
Court further recognized that collateral mortgages are now 
statutorily based rather than jurisprudential in nature, with post-
1989 collateral mortgages being subject to the Louisiana collateral 
mortgage statute.154 
B. Alaska Southern Partners v. Baxley 
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Alaska 
Southern Partners v. Baxley155 denied the plaintiff the right to sue to 
collect payment of the debtor’s collateral mortgage note without 
properly suing to collect under the third-party obligor’s hand note. 
The Second Circuit held that a collateral mortgage note is not a real 
note (i.e., an evidence of indebtedness) but a security instrument that 
can be pledged to secure payment of the obligor’s true indebtedness. 
As such, it was improper for the plaintiff to attempt to substitute the 
defendant’s collateral mortgage note for the debtor’s hand note, 
which the plaintiff could not locate. As the court stated, “[t]he 
collateral mortgage note was not conceived as being a separate 
enforceable instrument like other promissory notes. Standing alone, 
it has no actual value. Accordingly, and contrary to Alaska’s 
assertions, without proof of the underlying debt, the collateral 
mortgage note is not an enforceable obligation.”156 
C. Hibernia National Bank v. Contractor’s Equipment & Supply, 
Inc. 
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal refused to allow the 
plaintiff bank in Hibernia National Bank v. Contractor’s Equipment 
& Supply, Inc.157 to independently enforce payment of a third-party 
collateral mortgage note against a debtor, who had not personally 
guaranteed the third-party obligor’s hand note. The Third Circuit 
affirmed that the “maker of a collateral mortgage note . . . is not 
                                                                                                             
 153. Benoit, 780 So. 2d at 379. 
 154. Id. at 379–80. 
 155. 799 So. 2d 680 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
 156. Id. at 683. 
 157. 804 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
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personally liable beyond the value of the mortgaged property when 
the collateral mortgage note is pledged to secure the debt of a third 
party.”158  
D. Ellis Construction, Inc. v. Vieux Carre Resort Properties, L.L.C.  
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal recognized in 
Ellis Construction, Inc. v. Vieux Carre Resort Properties, L.L.C.159 
that the pledge aspects of post-1989 Louisiana collateral mortgages 
are subject to Louisiana UCC Article 9. The plaintiff, Ellis 
Construction (EC), was unable to locate the defendant’s, Vieux Carre 
Resort Properties, L.L.C. (VCRP), hand note at the time EC instituted 
an executory process foreclosure action against the mortgaged 
property. VCRP attempted to enjoin the foreclosure sale, claiming 
that EC had not procedurally complied with the strict requirements 
of executory process set forth under the Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure, which required that EC introduce authentic evidence of 
the plaintiff’s secured indebtedness in the form of the hand note.160 
The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that, since the 
pledge of VCRP’s collateral mortgage note was subject to Louisiana 
UCC Article 9, all that EC was required to do under Louisiana UCC 
section 9-629161 was to file a verified affidavit with the court 
attesting to the fact that (1) EC has a UCC security interest in the 
defendant’s pledged collateral mortgage note, (2) the pledged note 
secures VCRP’s indebtedness owed to EC, (3) VCRP is presently 
in default in paying that indebtedness, and (4) the amount of the 
secured indebted due and owing is $XXX, plus continued accrual 
of interest, fees, charges, costs, and expenses.162 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ellis Construction is correct 
with respect to the court’s holding that Louisiana UCC Article 9 
applied to VCRP’s pledge of the collateral mortgage note. The 
court, however, was incorrect in holding that Louisiana UCC 
section 9-629 applied to EC’s executory process foreclosure action 
against the mortgaged real estate. First and foremost, a mortgagee 
(in this case, EC) does not foreclose against the pledged collateral 
mortgage note when there is a default under a real estate loan 
secured by a collateral mortgage. The mortgagee instead forecloses 
against the mortgaged property by filing an executory process 
petition before the court in the same manner as a mortgagee might 
                                                                                                             
 158. Id. at 763. 
 159. 934 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 160. Id. at 209. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2635–2637 (2015). 
 161. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-626 (Supp. 2015). 
 162. See id. § 10:9-629(a); see also Stuckey, supra note 58, at 854–56. 
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otherwise foreclose under an ordinary conventional mortgage or a 
multiple indebtedness mortgage. Second, Louisiana UCC section 
9-629 does not apply when a secured party seeks to assert default 
remedies against pledged notes—instruments under the UCC. The 
proper UCC default remedy that can be asserted against pledged 
notes/instruments is the collection of the notes from the payment 
obligors thereunder as provided under Louisiana UCC section 9-
607(a).163 Non-uniform Louisiana UCC section 9-629 does not 
apply to real estate mortgage foreclosures and is limited to 
executory process foreclosure actions against non-possessory goods 
collateral—such as inventory, equipment, farm products, and 
consumer goods—on which the secured party has a file-perfected 
only UCC security interest. Executory process foreclosure remedies 
were inserted into Louisiana UCC Article 9 as a means of 
foreclosing against goods collateral then in the debtor’s possession 
that the secured party otherwise was prohibited from seizing on its 
own initiative as a result of Louisiana’s public policy against the 
exercise of self-help repossession remedies.164 Louisiana UCC 
executory process foreclosure remedies were borrowed from the 
default remedies that apply to real estate mortgage foreclosures 
and from the executory process foreclosure remedies that once 
applied, prior to January 1, 1990, to old style chattel mortgages and 
collateral chattel mortgages that were completely replaced by UCC 
Article 9 security interests effective January 1, 1990.165  
E. Gutierrez v. Baldridge  
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal correctly held in 
Gutierrez v. Baldridge166 that Baldridge and his construction 
company failed to acquire an enforceable collateral mortgage 
against Gutierrez’s property because Baldridge could not prove 
that he ever physically possessed Gutierrez’s pledged collateral 
mortgage note and could not produce the original signed collateral 
mortgage note at time of foreclosure.167 The court rejected 
Baldridge’s assertion that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
13:3741168 applied under the circumstance, holding that Baldridge 
                                                                                                             
 163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-607(a) (Supp. 2015). 
 164. See id. § 10:9-609 cmts.  
 165. See WILLENZIK, LOUISIANA SECURED TRANSACTIONS, WEST GROUP 
PRACTICE GUIDE §§ 8:9–8:21 (2005) (explaining the reasons why executory 
process foreclosure remedies were included in Louisiana UCC Article 9); see 
also Stuckey, supra note 58, at 859–61. 
 166. 105 So. 3d 156 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 167. See id. at 160; supra note 81 (additional discussion of Gutierrez). 
 168. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3741 (2006) (suit on lost note). 
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did not have an enforceable security interest under Gutierrez’s 
collateral mortgage in the first place because Baldridge never 
possessed the collateral mortgage note in pledge.169 
F. Sciortino v. Bank of Louisiana 
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal correctly held in 
Sciortino v. Bank of Louisiana170 that Sciortino’s December 14, 
1990 collateral mortgage additionally secured repayment of 
Sciortino’s subsequent contingent obligations under a letter of 
credit facility as a result of the inclusion of broadly drafted future 
advance/cross-collateralization language in Sciortino’s collateral 
pledge/UCC security agreement.171 The Fourth Circuit nonetheless 
erred in basing its decision in Sciortino on pre-1990 collateral 
mortgage cases (including Silversmiths, Alford, Bozorg, and 
Coates), which no longer apply to post-1989 collateral mortgages.172 
As repeatedly stated in this Article173 and in the 1994 Willenzik  
Article,174 these prior cases should no longer be cited as authority, 
other than in a historical context, with respect to post-1989 collateral 
mortgages granted on and after January 1, 1990.175  
III. MULTIPLE INDEBTEDNESS MORTGAGES176 
Louisiana multiple indebtedness mortgages are a direct and 
convenient substitute for old style, future advance collateral 
mortgages discussed in Parts I and II of this Article. 
A. History and Purpose 
Multiple indebtedness mortgages177 were first authorized by the 
1991 comprehensive revisions to the mortgage articles of the 
                                                                                                             
 169. Gutierrez, 105 So. 3d at 162, 164. 
 170. 705 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
 171. Id. at 817.  
 172. Id. at 816. 
 173. See supra text accompanying note 51 and infra text accompanying note 
230. 
 174. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 33, 47, 
61. 
 175. Sciortino’s collateral mortgage was granted on December 14, 1990, 
after Louisiana UCC Article 9 and the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute 
became effective. 
 176. For a discussion of multiple indebtedness mortgages, see Willenzik, 
Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 48–61; RUBIN, supra note 21, ¶ 
13.3; Rubin et al., supra note 2.  
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Louisiana Civil Code, in which the Louisiana State Law Institute and 
the Legislature eliminated the rule of former Civil Code article 3285 
that a lien of an ordinary conventional mortgage is automatically 
reduced on a pro tanto, dollar-for-dollar basis as principal payments 
are made on the mortgage note, which in turn had prevented ordinary 
conventional mortgages from directly securing future advances and 
other cross-collateralized debt.178 The 1991 Civil Code mortgage 
revisions also added revised Civil Code article 3298, which for the 
first time permits Louisiana conventional mortgages to directly 
secure future loans and other obligations on an open-end basis. 
Multiple indebtedness mortgages are a special purpose form179 of 
open-end, future advance mortgage, which are authorized under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3298, and which the Law Institute 
intended to be a “direct and convenient substitute” for old style 
collateral mortgages first developed in the mid-19th century.180  
B. Ability to Secure Future Advances on a Retroactive Priority 
Basis 
Revised Civil Code article 3298 permits multiple indebtedness 
mortgages to secure the mortgagor’s181 (or as applicable, a third-
                                                                                                             
 
 177. Multiple indebtedness mortgages are sometimes referred to as “future 
advance mortgages,” which is a misnomer and easily confused with staged-
advance mortgages. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmts. (2015) (referring to 
multiple indebtedness mortgages as “future obligation mortgages”); see also 
supra note 21 (discussing staged-advanced mortgages). 
 178. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 17. 
 179. Louisiana State Law Institute 1991 Revision Comment (b) to Louisiana 
Civil Code article 3298 emphatically states that multiple indebtedness 
mortgages are not a “distinct or different form of mortgage,” presumably using 
the word “form” in the substantive sense. The author here uses the word “form” 
in a documentary sense because multiple indebtedness mortgage agreements 
typically contain different contractual provisions than those found in ordinary 
conventional mortgage and collateral mortgage agreements. For suggested 
contractual provisions typically included in multiple indebtedness mortgage 
agreements, see infra Part III.D. 
 180. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmt. a (2015). 
 181. This article refers to the mortgagor under a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage as a “mortgagor,” and to the named mortgagee (and its successors and 
assigns) as a “mortgagee.” This should not be confused with the fact that this 
article refers to the mortgagor under a future advance collateral mortgage as a 
“debtor,” and the mortgagee as a “secured party.” Mortgagor and mortgagee are 
proper mortgage terms; whereas, debtor and secured party are proper UCC 
terms, which is correct in the case of a collateral mortgage when the secured 
party’s primary security interest is the UCC pledge of the debtor’s collateral 
mortgage note. 
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party obligor’s)182 future advances and other cross-collateralized 
debt with retroactive ranking priority vis-à-vis competing third 
persons back to the time the mortgage was originally recorded in 
the parish mortgage records:  
Art. 3298. Mortgage may secure future obligations  
 
A. A mortgage may secure obligations that may arise in the 
future. 
 
B. As to all obligations, present and future, secured by the 
mortgage, notwithstanding the nature of such obligations or 
the date they arise, the mortgage has effect between the 
parties from the time the mortgage is established and as to 
third persons from the time the contract of mortgage is filed 
for registry. . . .183 
The Louisiana State Law Institute’s 1991 Revision Comments (a) 
through (d) to article 3298 further state: 
(a) . . . Article [3298], and certain supplemental legislation 
adopted with it (R.S. 9:5555-5557),184 is intended to 
provide a direct and convenient substitute for the so-called 
collateral mortgage, which in recent years has become 
widely used, and to permit a person to mortgage his 
property to secure a line of credit, or even to secure 
obligations that may not then be contemplated by him 
except in the broadest sense of an expectation that he may 
someday incur an obligation to the mortgagee. 
 
(b) . . . A mortgage may secure existing obligations; 
obligations contemporaneously incurred with the execution 
of the mortgage or specific identifiable or particular and 
limited future obligations; or general and indefinite future 
obligations; or any combination of them. The matter is one 
of contract, not law . . . .  
 
                                                                                                             
 182. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3295 (2015) (providing that a mortgage may 
secure third party debt). 
 183. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298(A), (B) (2015). 
 184.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5555 (2007) (providing that there is no 
requirement that mortgage notes be paraphed ne varietur for identification with 
accessory mortgages secured thereby in order for the mortgagee to have the right 
to foreclose under the mortgage utilizing Louisiana executory process 
procedures). Section 9:5555 is consistent with Louisiana Civil Code articles 
3298(C) and 3325, both of which provide that paraphing of mortgage notes with 
accessory mortgages is no longer required. 
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(c) Paragraph B declares that a mortgage securing future 
obligations has the same effect and priority it would have if 
the obligations were in existence when the contract of 
mortgage was entered into. . . . 
 
(d) The effect and rank of a mortgage securing future 
obligations thus essentially corresponds to the effect and 
rank which it would have if it secured a collateral note that 
was pledged to secure the future obligations, with the 
exception that the Article does not require that there initially 
be a debt or commitment in order to give vitality to the 
mortgage. Of course the contract of mortgage must be in 
existence and, to affect third persons acquiring rights in and 
to the thing mortgaged, it must be recorded. Once recorded, 
however, it serves as notice to the world that, until released 
or cancelled, it encumbers the property it describes to secure 
the obligations it contemplates.185 
The Expose des Motifs accompanying Act 652 of 1991 provides 
additional guidance: “If the mortgagor incurs an obligation that the 
mortgage secures before the contract of mortgage is terminated or 
extinguished, then that obligation will be secured to the same extent 
as if it had existed when the mortgage was first established.” 
Reading the above quoted provisions together, a multiple 
indebtedness mortgage is able to secure future advances and other 
cross-collateralized debt with retroactive ranking priority back to the 
time of original mortgage recordation, provided that (1) the 
mortgage agreement contains expansive future advance/cross-
collateralization language,186 (2) the mortgage is properly recorded 
in the parish mortgage records,187 and (3) the ten-year inscription 
of the mortgage is not allowed to lapse. 188 
                                                                                                             
 185. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmts. a–d (2015). 
 186. The inclusion of expansive future advance/cross-collateralization 
language in the mortgage agreement is the key contractual provision that permits 
a multiple indebtedness mortgage to secure multiple present and future 
indebtedness of the mortgagor to the mortgagee. As stated in Revision Comment 
(b), when the mortgage agreement so provides, a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage is able to contractually secure existing obligations, obligations 
contemporaneously incurred at the time the mortgage is granted, other 
specifically identifiable or particular and limited future obligations, general and 
indefinite future obligations, or any combination of the foregoing.  
 187. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298(B) (2015) (providing that a multiple 
indebtedness mortgage becomes effective and takes  ranking priority as against 
third persons from the time the contract of mortgage is filed for registry in the 
parish mortgage records). 
 188. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3357 (2015). The inscription of a recorded 
multiple indebtedness mortgage lapses, and the mortgage ceases to be effective 
2015] LOUISIANA FUTURE ADVANCE MORTGAGES 659 
 
 
 
C. Comparison with Collateral Mortgages 
A Louisiana collateral mortgage is able to secure future 
advances and other cross-collateralized debt only by securing a 
fictitious, contrived collateral mortgage note, which is then 
pledged under an equally contrived collateral pledge/UCC security 
agreement to secure the debtor’s true indebtedness evidenced by 
one or more hand notes or some other writing. There are at least 
four documents in a typical collateral mortgage package: (1) a 
collateral mortgage, (2) a collateral mortgage note, (3) a collateral 
pledge/UCC possessory security agreement, and (4) one or more 
hand notes or other writing evidencing the obligor’s true 
indebtedness. The real security interest in a collateral mortgage 
arrangement is the UCC pledge of the debtor’s collateral mortgage 
note, with the debtor’s accessory collateral mortgage following the 
pledged note to indirectly secure the obligor’s true indebtedness.  
By way of comparison, there are only two documents in a 
typical multiple indebtedness mortgage package: (1) a multiple 
indebtedness mortgage, and (2) one or more hand notes or other 
writings giving rise to or evidencing the secured indebtedness. The 
mortgagor’s multiple indebtedness mortgage directly secures the 
mortgagor’s true secured indebtedness189 as defined in the 
mortgage agreement.190 There is no collateral pledge/UCC security 
agreement and no fictitious, contrived collateral mortgage note to 
be delivered in pledge to the mortgagee and physically retained 
until such time as the mortgage is released and cancelled. 
Additionally, there is no collateral mortgage note for the 
                                                                                                             
 
against third persons if and when the mortgage is not reinscribed on the public 
mortgage records every ten years counting from the date the mortgage was 
originally executed rather than the date that the mortgage was first recorded. Id. 
The fact that the ten-year inscription period of a recorded mortgage starts from 
the “date of the instrument” rather than from the date of original recordation, is 
an easily confused and overlooked requirement. 
 189. A multiple indebtedness mortgage is able to do directly what a future 
advance collateral mortgage is able to do only on an indirect basis; that is, to 
secure present and future indebtedness up to the maximum limit provided in the 
mortgage agreement on a retroactive priority basis back to the time the mortgage 
was originally recorded in the parish mortgage records. 
 190. For a suggested contractual definition of “secured indebtedness” to be 
included in a well drafted multiple indebtedness mortgage agreement, see infra 
Part III.D.2. A multiple indebtedness mortgage may secure any then existing or 
future debt or performance obligation. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3294, 3298(A), 
(B) (1990). There is no requirement that the secured indebtedness be evidenced 
by one or more hand notes.  
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mortgagee to lose or misplace, or to be barred by the five-year 
prescriptive period of Civil Code article 3498.  
Furthermore, there is no requirement that the mortgagee under 
a multiple indebtedness mortgage initially give value by funding a 
mortgage loan or issuing a binding loan commitment. As 
previously discussed in Part I.D.6 of this Article with respect to 
delayed, anticipatory credit situations, a collateral mortgage 
becomes effective and takes its priority ranking vis-à-vis third 
persons from the time that the mortgage is recorded in the parish 
mortgage records, or the time that the secured party’s possessory 
UCC security interest in the pledged collateral mortgage note 
becomes fully perfected, whichever is the last to occur.191 Full 
perfection requires that the secured party give value either by 
initially funding a loan or loan advance or issuing a binding loan 
commitment to lend at a later date. By way of comparison, a 
multiple indebtedness mortgage becomes effective and takes its 
ranking priority from “the time the contract of mortgage is filed for 
registry,”192 and there is no requirement that “there initially be a 
debt or commitment in order to give vitality to the mortgage.”193 
Additionally, there is no concern that a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage may cease to be effective vis-à-vis third persons when 
the balance of the secured mortgage indebtedness subsequently is 
reduced to $0.00, and there then is no binding forward 
commitment to lend additional funds to the mortgagor, e.g., a 
lapsed credit situation previously discussed in Part I.D.5 of this 
Article. As Civil Code article 3298(E) affirms, a recorded multiple 
indebtedness mortgage continues to be effective against third 
persons until terminated by the mortgagee or his successor. 
Louisiana State Law Institute 1991 Revision Comment (f) to Civil 
Code article 3298(E) further explains: 
Paragraph E reinforces the principle implicit in Paragraphs B 
and C of this Article as discussed in the preceding comment, 
and more fully explained in the Expose des Motifs, that the 
mortgage is fully in existence, though its enforcement may 
be conditional, and even though no obligations are then 
secured. . . . Resort must be had to the contract of mortgage to 
see what obligations it may secure. . . . If on the other hand, 
the mortgage secures future, indefinite obligations with a 
maximum limit on their aggregate balance from time to time, 
then in essence, the mortgage continues indefinitely until it is 
                                                                                                             
 191. See supra Part I.D.6. 
 192. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298(B) (2015). 
 193. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmt. d (2015).  
2015] LOUISIANA FUTURE ADVANCE MORTGAGES 661 
 
 
 
terminated by notice of the mortgagor or the consent of the 
parties, or in some other manner recognized by law.194 
D. Form and Content Requirements Applicable to Multiple 
Indebtedness Mortgage Agreements 
There are certain form and content requirements that apply to 
multiple indebtedness mortgage agreements as compared to those 
that apply to ordinary conventional mortgage and collateral 
mortgage agreements. 
1. Title and Definition of Mortgagee  
A well-drafted multiple indebtedness mortgage agreement 
should bear the following caption title: 
Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage  
By: [name of mortgagor] 
In favor of [name of initial named mortgagee] 
and its successors and assigns 
The purpose of titling the mortgage as a “Multiple Indebtedness 
Mortgage” is to distinguish the mortgage on the public record from 
an ordinary conventional mortgage so as to place potential third 
persons on public notice that the mortgage may secure future debts 
and other obligations up to the maximum dollar limit specified in 
the mortgage agreement. Third persons searching the public 
mortgage records need to be aware of the special nature of a 
multiple indebtedness mortgage as an open-end mortgage 
instrument when evaluating the merits of taking a junior secured 
position on the same property.195 
The purpose of stating that the mortgage is granted in favor of a 
named mortgagee, as compared to the old practice of granting a 
collateral mortgage in favor of “any person, firm or corporation,”196 
is to comply with the mortgage cancellation procedures of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:5169,197 which require that a mortgage 
cancellation certificate be signed by the “obligee of record of the 
mortgage,” meaning the named mortgagee or its successor or 
assignee filing an assignment of mortgage in the public mortgage 
                                                                                                             
 194. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmt. f (2015). 
 195. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 57–58; 
see also RUBIN, supra note 21, ¶ 13.3(a). 
 196. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 12–13 
(discussing so-called “landed mortgages”). 
 197. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5169 (2005). 
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records. Granting the mortgage in favor of a named mortgagee also 
serves to alert potential third persons of the named mortgagee’s 
identity so that the named mortgagee may be provided with so-
called Mennonite notices198 should the mortgaged property ever be 
seized and sold at a foreclosure or tax sale.199 
The purpose of including successors-and-assigns language in 
the title of a multiple indebtedness mortgage, and in the definition 
of the “Mortgagee,”200 is to emphasize that the mortgage is being 
granted not only to secure loans and loan advances extended by the 
named mortgagee, but also to secure loans and loan advances 
extended by the named mortgagee’s successors and assigns. This was 
an issue in Bozorg,201 a collateral mortgage case discussed in the 1994 
Willenzik Article,202 and in KeyBank National Association v. Perkins 
Rowe Associates, LLC,203 a multiple indebtedness mortgage case 
discussed in Part IV.B of this Article. 
2. Definition of the Secured Indebtedness 
A well-drafted multiple indebtedness mortgage agreement 
should include a broad, expansive definition of the indebtedness 
secured by the mortgage. Suggested language is as follows: 
Indebtedness. The word “Indebtedness” as used in this 
Mortgage means individually, collectively and interchangeably 
(i) any and all present and future loans, advances and/or other 
extensions of credit obtained and/or to be obtained by 
                                                                                                             
 198. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). See Rubin 
& Carter, supra note 139; see also Davis Oil v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 
1989) (holding that a seizing creditor has a duty to provide notice to persons 
having an interest in property to be sold at foreclosure or tax sale, provided that 
the identity of such interested persons is known to the seizing creditor or is 
otherwise reasonably ascertainable).  
 199. See Sec. First Nat’l Bank v. Murchison, 739 So. 2d 803 (La. Ct. App. 
1999) (dealing with a situation in which an old-style collateral mortgage was 
granted in favor of “any person, firm, or corporation,” as compared to being 
granted in favor of a named mortgagee, resulting in the taxing agency being 
uncertain as to proper person to send a required Mennonite notice to in 
connection with a forced tax sale of the mortgaged property). 
 200. The inclusion of successors-and-assigns language in the definition of 
“Mortgagee” reinforces the position that the mortgage not only secures 
indebtedness owed to the mortgagee named in the title and preface to the 
mortgage agreement, but also secures indebtedness owed to the named 
mortgagee’s successors and assigns.  
 201. Tex. Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 444 So. 2d 698 (La. Ct. App.), rev’d 
in part, 457 So. 2d 667 (La. 1984). 
 202. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
 203. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., 823 F. Supp. 2d 399 
(M.D. La. 2011).   
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Mortgagor (or by a third party obligor or obligors designated 
by Mortgagor) from Mortgagee, as well as from Mortgagee’s 
successors and assigns, from time to time, one or more times, 
now and in the future, under any and all promissory notes 
evidencing such present and/or future loans, advances and/or 
other extensions of credit, including without limitation, a 
promissory note dated __________, in the principal amount 
of $_______, and any and all amendments thereto and/or 
substitutions therefor, and any and all renewals, extensions 
and refinancings thereof; as well as (ii) any and all other 
obligations and liabilities that Mortgagor (or a third party 
obligor or obligors designated by Mortgagor) may now 
and/or in the future owe to and/or incur in favor of 
Mortgagee, as well as in favor of Mortgagee’s successors 
or assigns, whether direct or indirect, or by way of 
assignment or purchase of a participation interest, and 
whether related or unrelated, or committed or purely 
discretionary, and whether absolute or contingent, 
liquidated or unliquidated, voluntary or involuntary, due or 
to become due, and whether now existing or hereafter 
arising, of every nature and kind whatsoever, and whether 
Mortgagor is obligated alone or with others on a joint and 
several or solidary basis as a surety, guarantor, or endorser; 
with all of the foregoing loans, loan advances, extensions 
of credit, and other and future indebtedness, obligations, 
and liabilities referenced in (i) and (ii) above, being subject 
to a maximum principal dollar limitation of $____, as may 
be outstanding from time to time, one or more times, and 
with all interest, fees, charges, costs, and expenses relating 
thereto being additionally secured by the lien of this 
Mortgage up to a maximum amount equal to twice (2X) the 
foregoing principal dollar limit.204 
This broad, expansive definition of the secured indebtedness is 
critical to permitting a multiple indebtedness mortgage to secure 
present and future indebtedness and other cross-collateralized debt 
as provided under Civil Code article 3298.205 Civil Code article 
                                                                                                             
 204. This same definition of “indebtedness” may be included in a well-
drafted collateral pledge/UCC security agreement found in a collateral mortgage 
package, with the possible exception that there is no requirement under Revised 
UCC Article 9 that a UCC collateral pledge/security agreement specify the 
maximum amount of the secured indebtedness.  
 205. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmt. b (2015) (stating that the parties to a 
multiple indebtedness mortgage must contractually agree that the mortgage will 
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3288 requires that a multiple indebtedness mortgage agreement 
specify “the maximum amount of the obligations that may be 
outstanding at any time and from time to time that the mortgage 
secures.”206 The purpose of including successors-and-assigns 
language in the above definition is once again to affirm that the 
secured indebtedness additionally includes loans and other 
indebtedness owed to the named mortgagee’s successors and 
assigns. 
3. Grant of Mortgage  
Every mortgage must include granting language under which 
the mortgagor grants a security interest in the form of a mortgage 
on the mortgaged property in favor of the named mortgagee and its 
successors and assigns to secure payment of the secured 
indebtedness. Suggested granting language is as follows: 
Grant of Mortgage. In order to secure the prompt and 
punctual payment and satisfaction of the Indebtedness (as 
defined herein) in principal, interest, costs, expenses, 
attorneys’ fees and other fees and charges, and additionally 
to secure all Additional Advances207 that Mortgagee may 
make on Mortgagor’s behalf, together with interest thereon, 
                                                                                                             
 
secure the mortgagor’s present and future indebtedness as defined in the 
mortgage agreement).  
 206. Louisiana Civil Code article 3288 requires that a mortgage agreement 
securing future advances and other cross-collateralized debt affirmatively state 
the maximum secured amount. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3288 (2015). Article 3288 
however is unclear and provides no guidance as to whether this dollar limit 
includes principal only, or additionally includes interest, fees, charges, costs and 
expense that the mortgagor may owe to the mortgagee. Many mortgage creditors 
set this dollar limit at an arbitrarily high amount (e.g., $50 million) in order to 
protect themselves from running out of space under the credit cap. See RUBIN, 
supra note 21, ¶ 13.11(a). 
 207. A mortgage agreement typically obligates the mortgagor to maintain 
insurance on the mortgaged property and to pay taxes and other assessments and 
keep the mortgaged property in good repair and condition, so long as the 
mortgage remains in effect. The mortgage agreement further typically provides 
that, should the mortgagor fail to do any of the foregoing for any reason, the 
mortgagee may step in and purchase forced-placed insurance, pay taxes, and 
make necessary repairs to the mortgaged property, for and on behalf of the 
mortgagor and at the mortgagor’s expense. “Additional Advances” typically 
represent funds advanced by the mortgagee for such purposes, and are subject to 
reimbursement by the mortgagor, together with interest thereon, with the 
mortgagor’s reimbursement obligations being additionally secured by the 
mortgage. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5389 (2007) (mortgage securing 
additional advances for payment of insurance, taxes, etc.).  
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Mortgagor does hereby grant to and in favor of Mortgagee 
and Mortgagee’s successors and assigns, a mortgage 
encumbering any and all of Mortgagor’s present and future 
rights, title and interest in and to the Mortgaged Property as 
more fully described herein, or in an exhibit attached hereto 
and made a part hereof, all to the maximum extent 
permitted under applicable Louisiana law. 
4. Declaration of Intent that the Mortgage Secure Future 
Advances  
A well-drafted multiple indebtedness mortgage agreement 
additionally should contain an affirmation on the part of the 
mortgagor that the mortgage is being granted to secure the 
mortgagor’s (or third-party obligor’s) present indebtedness as well 
as indebtedness that may arise in the future, with the continuing 
preferences and priority as provided under Louisiana Civil Code 
article 3298 and other applicable law.208 Suggested (but in no way 
mandatory) language is as follows: 
Mortgage Securing Future Indebtedness. This Mortgage is 
being granted by Mortgagor pursuant to Article 3298 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code for the purpose of securing Indebtedness 
that may now be existing or that may arise in the future, with 
the continuing preferences and priority provided by applicable 
law. However, nothing under this Mortgage shall be construed 
as limiting the duration of this Mortgage or the purpose or 
purposes for which the Indebtedness may be requested or 
extended. Mortgagor’s additional Indebtedness will 
automatically be secured by this Mortgage without the 
                                                                                                             
 208. The purpose of including an affirmative declaration of this type in a 
well-drafted multiple indebtedness mortgage agreement is to counter any 
subsequent assertion on the part of the mortgagor, or by a third person, or by a 
court of law or in bankruptcy, that the mortgagor never understood, intended, or 
agreed that the mortgage and the mortgaged property would secure repayment of 
other and future indebtedness up to the maximum limit provided in the mortgage 
agreement. As recognized in Louisiana State Law Institute 1991 Revision 
Comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code article 3298, the ability of a multiple 
indebtedness mortgage to secure other and future indebtedness is a “matter of 
contract.” In Louisiana, persons are obligated under the clear and unambiguous 
language of contracts they sign unless such covenants are deemed to be against 
public policy. As stated in former Louisiana Civil Code article 3158(C)(2) 
(1870), cross-collateralization is not, and never has been, against Louisiana 
public policy. There absolutely is no requirement that a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage agreement make mention of, or state that the mortgage is granted 
under and pursuant to, Louisiana Civil Code article 3298. The foregoing is 
merely suggested language. 
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necessity that Mortgagor agree, consent to, reaffirm or 
acknowledge such result at the time or times that additional 
Indebtedness is incurred,209 or that the note or notes 
evidencing such additional Indebtedness reference the fact 
that such note or notes are secured by this Mortgage.210 
Mortgagor recognizes, covenants and unconditionally agrees 
that Mortgagor may not subsequently have a change in mind 
and insist that any such additional Indebtedness not be 
secured by this Mortgage unless Mortgagee shall otherwise 
agree in writing.211  
5. Duration of Mortgage  
A well-drafted multiple indebtedness mortgage agreement should 
also include a Duration section providing to the following effect: 
Duration of Mortgage. This Mortgage will remain in effect 
until such time as the inscription of this Mortgage is 
cancelled and terminated on the public mortgage records in 
the manner prescribed by law. 
                                                                                                             
 209. The purpose of including language in the declaration to the effect that 
the mortgagor is not required to reaffirm each time a subsequent loan is made 
that the subsequent indebtedness is secured by the mortgagor’s then-existing 
multiple indebtedness mortgage is to pretermit any potential argument, such as 
that made in Coates, that the mortgagor’s reaffirmation is in fact required. See 
generally Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Coates, 563 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
Although Coates was a pre-1990 collateral mortgage case, it is possible that the 
holding of Coates may be incorrectly extended by a court to additionally apply 
to multiple indebtedness mortgages. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority 
Rights, supra note 1, at 27–30 (critically discussing Coates); see also discussion 
supra Part IV.B (discussing the KeyBank decision in which an 
Acknowledgement of Mortgage played a key role). 
 210. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298(C) (2015) (providing that a mortgage note 
need not be paraphed ne varietur for identification with the mortgage, or recite 
that the note is secured by the mortgage). 
 211. The reason why this non-back-out covenant is included in the declaration 
of intent is to prevent the mortgagor from later insisting that a subsequent loan not 
be secured by the mortgagor’s existing multiple indebtedness mortgage (unless the 
mortgagee should otherwise agree in writing). Although the mortgagor has the 
right to prepay the secured indebtedness in full and to insist that the mortgage be 
terminated and cancelled on the public records, the mortgagor should not have the 
right to unilaterally pick and choose which subsequent loans are secured by the 
existing mortgage and which are not. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority 
Rights, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
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6. Mortgage Cancellation  
Civil Code article 3298(D)212 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 
sections 9:5163–5173213 set forth the procedures for cancelling the 
inscription of a multiple indebtedness mortgage on the public 
records. Some multiple indebtedness mortgage agreements contain 
contractual mortgage cancellation covenants, while others do not. 
The following suggested language is for those mortgage lenders 
who chose to include mortgage cancellation provisions in their 
multiple indebtedness mortgage agreements: 
Mortgage Cancellation. Mortgagor may request Mortgagee 
to terminate, and to cause the inscription of this Mortgage 
to be cancelled from the public mortgage records, provided 
that Mortgagee is satisfied in its reasonable judgment that 
(i) all of the Indebtedness secured by this Mortgage has 
been fully paid and satisfied (or in the case of the 
contingent obligations that have yet to accrue, adequate 
reserves have been established in the form of escrow 
deposits or third-party guarantees in favor of Mortgagee), 
and (ii) there is no then agreement or commitment on the 
part of Mortgagee to advance additional funds to or on 
Mortgagor’s behalf. Both of the above conditions must be 
satisfied in Mortgagee’s reasonable judgment in order for 
Mortgagee to undertake to cancel this Mortgage. Mortgagor 
agrees that Mortgagee may delay cancelling this Mortgage 
on the public records for up to thirty days (or longer if 
necessary) following receipt of Mortgagor’s initial 
cancellation request, which delay period shall constitute 
reasonable advance notice to Mortgagee for all purposes.214 
7. No Ne Varietur Paraph  
It is neither necessary nor appropriate for a promissory note 
evidencing a loan secured by a Louisiana multiple indebtedness 
mortgage to be paraphed ne varietur for identification with the 
                                                                                                             
 212. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmt. e (2015) (regarding cancellation of 
multiple indebtedness mortgages). 
 213. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:5163–5173 (2011). 
 214. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298(D) (2015) (providing that the parties may 
contractually agree that the mortgagee has a reasonable period of time following 
receipt of the mortgagor’s initial request within which to cancel the mortgage on 
the public mortgage records). 
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mortgage.215 The reason why is to prevent the mortgagor from 
canceling the mortgage on the public records by presenting a 
paraphed note marked paid in full without authority to do so.216 
IV. SIGNIFICANT MULTIPLE INDEBTEDNESS MORTGAGE CASES 
There are  three significant multiple indebtedness mortgage 
cases that were decided over the past 23 years since the 1991 
comprehensive revisions to the mortgage articles of the Louisiana 
Civil Code first became effective. 
A. In re Hari Aum 
1. Facts and Disposition  
The facts of the In re Hari Aum217 bankruptcy case are as 
follows. In January 2005, the debtor,218 Hari Aum, LLC, obtained 
a $1.8 million loan from First Guaranty Bank of Hammond (FGB) 
secured by a Louisiana multiple indebtedness mortgage (the 
“Louisiana Mortgage”) dated January 27, 2005, on the debtor’s motel 
property (the “Deluxe Motel”) in Slidell, Louisiana. The mortgage 
instrument was a Louisiana LaserPro multiple indebtedness mortgage 
form,219 which contained a broad, expansive definition of the secured 
indebtedness, and which further contained future advance/cross-
collateralization language.220 The Louisiana Mortgage was properly 
recorded in the St. Tammany Parish mortgage records on February 
1, 2005. In May 2006, the owner and sole member of Hari Aum, 
                                                                                                             
 215. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298(C) (2015) (providing that a note secured by a 
multiple indebtedness mortgage need not be paraphed ne varietur for identification 
with the mortgage). 
 216. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 55. 
 217. No. 10–12931, 2011 WL 2746149 (Bankr. E.D. La. July 12, 2011), 
aff’d, 714 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2013). The author has elected to discuss the Hari 
Aum bankruptcy case before discussing the KeyBank case, which technically 
was decided before Hari Aum. For a discussion of KeyBank, see infra Part IV.B.  
 218. The term “debtor” as used within Part IV.A refers to Hari Aum in its 
capacity of debtor in possession in the debtor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The 
term debtor as used herein should not be confused with use of the term debtor in 
Parts I and II of this article to refer to the party granting a UCC security interest 
in collateral and the party granting a Louisiana collateral mortgage on its 
property. 
 219. LaserPro is a computerized loan documentation system used by FGB 
and numerous other Louisiana banks, and self-generates customized loan 
documents based on criteria inputted by the user. 
 220. To view the future advance/cross-collateralization provisions of the Hari 
Aum mortgage, see In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 2746149, at *6; In re Hari Aum, 
714 F.3d at 276–77.  
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Sam Bhula, applied for an additional loan from FGB to acquire a 
motel in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Bhula then formed a new 
company, Mississippi Hospitality Services, LLC (MHS), to be the 
borrower under the additional FGB loan and to be the owner of the 
Hattiesburg motel property. This additional loan in the amount of 
$4.9 million (the “Mississippi Loan”) was secured by a Mississippi 
deed of trust on the Hattiesburg motel, which was properly 
recorded in the Forrest County, Mississippi, public records. At the 
time that Bhula applied to FGB for the Mississippi Loan, it was 
agreed that Hari Aum’s existing Louisiana Mortgage on the Slidell 
motel property would additionally secure MHS’s subsequent 
Mississippi Loan to acquire the Hattiesburg motel. FGB’s loan 
commitment to Bhula with respect to the $4.9 million Mississippi 
Loan clearly provided to that effect.221 Both the Hari Aum original 
loan and the MHS Mississippi Loan were refinanced in April 2009, 
at which time Bhula personally guaranteed the Hari Aum loan and 
executed an Acknowledgement of Existing Multiple Indebtedness 
Mortgage222 (the “Acknowledgement”) on behalf of Hari Aum in 
which Bhula on behalf of Hari Aum acknowledged and affirmed 
that Hari Aum’s existing Louisiana Mortgage additionally secured 
the MHS Mississippi Loan. MHS’s refinancing note dated April 21, 
2009, further referenced the fact that the MHS Mississippi Loan 
additionally was secured by the Hari Aum Louisiana Mortgage. Hari 
Aum and MHS later experienced financial difficulty, and Hari Aum 
ultimately filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection from creditors. 
The Hari Aum bankruptcy case was heard before the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and decided 
in a Memorandum Opinion dated July 12, 2011.223 Hari Aum 
subsequently appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which 
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in favor of FGB.224 
2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision  
Hari Aum, in its capacity as Chapter 11 debtor in possession, 
made a number of assertions before the Bankruptcy Court denying 
that its January 2005 Louisiana Mortgage on the Slidell motel 
                                                                                                             
 221. FGB’s loan commitment to Bhula required that Hari Aum’s existing 
Louisiana Mortgage additionally would secure the MHS Mississippi Loan. 
Bhula accepted the FGB loan commitment, and thus agreed to that requirement. 
Bhula was the sole LLC member/owner of Hari Aum, and thus had the authority 
to bind and obligate his own company. 
 222. The Acknowledgement also was a LaserPro computer-generated form.  
 223. In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 2746149. 
 224. In re Hari Aum, 714 F.3d at 274. 
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property additionally secured the $4.9 million Mississippi Loan 
that FGB subsequently made to MHS. The debtor argued that, 
although the language of the Louisiana Mortgage clearly provided 
that the mortgaged property would secure the debts of third-party 
obligors to the extent that Hari Aum also was personally obligated 
on such third-party debts, the mortgage provided that the mortgaged 
property would additionally secure third-party debt only to the 
extent that Hari Aum was personally liable for payment either as a 
co-borrower or as a guarantor. Note that Hari Aum never executed a 
separate guaranty agreement personally guaranteeing payment of the 
MHS Mississippi Loan.225 The debtor further argued that, as Bhula’s 
subsequent agreement to permit Hari Aum’s existing Louisiana 
Mortgage to additionally secure MHS’s Mississippi Loan 
(presumably referring to the Acknowledgement)226 had the effect of 
enlarging the scope of the existing Louisiana Mortgage, this 
agreement should have been in the form of a formal amendment to 
the Louisiana Mortgage, executed in authentic form before a notary 
public and two witnesses, and filed in the St. Tammany Parish 
mortgage records. The debtor additionally argued that Bhula had no 
authority to agree on behalf of Hari Aum that the debtor’s existing 
Louisiana Mortgage additionally would secure MHS’s subsequent 
Mississippi Loan. The Bankruptcy Court rejected all of Hari Aum’s 
assertions, ultimately ruling in favor of FGB.227  
The court began by noting that multiple indebtedness mortgages 
were first authorized under the 1991 comprehensive revisions to the 
Civil Code mortgage articles as “a direct and convenient substitute 
                                                                                                             
 225. See  infra Part IV.A.5 (suggesting that the contentious issue of whether 
Hari Aum’s existing Louisiana mortgage additionally secured MHS’s subsequent 
Mississippi Loan could have been avoided had FGB required Hari Aum to 
personally guarantee the MHS Mississippi Loan by signing a separate guaranty 
agreement). 
 226. Hari Aum’s agreement that the debtor’s existing Louisiana Mortgage 
would additionally secure the MHS subsequent Mississippi Loan was not (as the 
debtor claimed) agreed to under the Acknowledgement, but instead was a 
condition of FGB’s May 2006 loan commitment to make an additional $4.9 
million Mississippi Loan to a to-be-formed Mississippi company (later organized 
as MHS), which condition was agreed to by Bhula on behalf of Hari Aum at the 
time Bhula accepted FGB’s loan commitment. See In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 
2746149, at *7 n.12. The Acknowledgement, which was later executed in April 
2009 at the time that the Hari Aum loan and MHS Loan were refinanced, merely 
reconfirmed Bhula’s and Hari Aum’s prior cross-collateralization agreement 
agreed to three years earlier as a result of Bhula’s acceptance of the FGB May 
2006 loan commitment. 
 227. In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 2746149, at *9 (“The court finds that the 
Deluxe Motel [Slidell, LA] property secures both FGB’s loan to the debtor and 
FGB’s loan to MHS.”).  
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for so-called collateral mortgages.”228 The court further noted that, 
until the filing of the present bankruptcy case, multiple indebtedness 
mortgages had been largely untested by the courts.229 The court then 
commented on the ability of multiple indebtedness mortgages to 
secure future advances and other cross-collateralized debt on a 
retroactive priority basis, quoting from the 1994 Willenzik 
Article230 as follows: 
If a multiple indebtedness mortgage is properly executed and 
filed, and if the mortgage contains broadly drafted future 
advance/cross-collateralization language, then any and all 
present and future extensions of credit and other obligations 
the borrower may obtain or incur in favor of the mortgagee, 
or its successors and assigns, while the mortgage remains 
effective, will be secured by the mortgage up to the 
maximum dollar limitation stipulated in the mortgage 
agreement, with retroactive priority rights over intervening 
creditors back to the time the mortgage originally was filed 
in the public records.231  
The court then proceeded to reject the debtor’s argument that the 
future advance/cross-collateralization language of the Hari Aum 
Louisiana Mortgage was not sufficiently broad to encompass FGB’s 
subsequent $4.9 million Mississippi Loan to MHS. The court 
examined the future advance/cross-collateralization language of the 
mortgage agreement, together with confirmatory language of the 
Acknowledgement, and found them to be sufficient to express 
Bhula’s and Hari Aum’s intent and agreement that the Hari Aum 
Louisiana Mortgage would additionally secure the MHS subsequent 
Mississippi Loan:  
The bank’s main contention that the MIM232 signed by the 
debtor, along with the promissory note signed by MHS and 
the Acknowledgement signed by the debtor are enough to 
create a valid mortgage on the Deluxe Motel to be used later 
to secure the loan from FGB to MHS. The court agrees. The 
                                                                                                             
 228. Id. at *4. 
 229. Id. 
 230. The Bankruptcy Court and the Fifth Circuit cited the 1994 Willenzik 
Article as secondary authority for certain of the legal conclusions forming the 
bases of the courts’ opinions. See In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 2746149, at *3, *5; 
In re Hari Aum, 714 F.3d at 274, 283–84. 
 231. See In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 2746149, at *3, *5; In re Hari Aum, 714 
F.3d at 274, 282–84 (quoting Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra 
note 1, at 50–51). 
 232. The Hari Aum Bankruptcy and Fifth Circuit Opinions refer to multiple 
indebtedness mortgages as “MIM’s.” 
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MIM clearly states that it secures all indebtedness of the 
debtor, whether the debtor is, “obligated alone or with others 
on a ‘solidary’ or ‘joint and several’ basis, as principal 
obligor or as a surety, guarantor, or endorser, of every nature 
and kind whatsoever.” The MIM was properly recorded on 
February 1, 2005, serving as notice to any potential creditors 
that the debtor’s property was encumbered up to the amount 
of $50 million for any present and future loans from FGB. 
Additionally, the promissory note dated April 21, 2009 
clearly lists the MIM as one of the pieces of collateral for the 
MHS loan. Finally, the Acknowledgement lists Hari Aum as 
the Grantor and MHS as the Borrower, and it grants a 
mortgage to FGB on the Deluxe Motel to secure the note 
executed by MHS.233 
The court additionally found that Hari Aum had in fact agreed 
to be personally obligated on the MHS Mississippi Loan as a result 
of language included in the Acknowledgement that Bhula signed 
on behalf of Hari Aum in April 2009: 
The provision [of Hari Aum’s multiple indebtedness 
mortgage] envisioning that the parties were contemplating 
future debts of entities other than just Hari Aum was fulfilled 
in 2009 when MHS refinanced its loan with FGB . . . . The 
Acknowledgement executed in 2009 by Bhula on behalf of 
Hari Aum names MHS as the Borrower and Hari Aum as the 
Grantor, identifies and describes the MIM of 2005 and then 
provides that the MIM was intended to secure any and all of 
MHS’s (and Hari Aum’s) debts, present and future, to FGB. 
The Acknowledgement goes on to provide, in a paragraph 
entitled Waivers, that Hari Aum shall remain bound with 
MHS on a joint and several or solidary basis. This waiver 
language is sufficient, in this court’s opinion, to bind Hari 
Aum on a personal basis (in solido) for the debts of MHS 
and affect a cross-collateralization whereby the Deluxe 
Motel is mortgaged to secure the MHS debt to FGB.234 
The court further rejected the debtor’s assertion that Bhula and 
Hari Aum’s subsequent agreement that the Louisiana Mortgage 
would additionally secure the MHS Mississippi Loan should have 
been in the form of a formal amendment to the mortgage agreement, 
executed in authentic form, and recorded in the parish mortgage 
records. As stated by the court:  
                                                                                                             
 233. In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 2746149, at *8. 
 234. Id. at *6.  
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If the prior practice [referring to future advances under old 
style Louisiana collateral mortgages] did not require an 
additional recordation when a future advance was made and 
if the amendment to article 3298 and the statutory provisions 
for a MIM were to make the securitization of future loans 
easier and more adaptable to modern day financing, it is 
difficult to understand Hari Aum’s arguments that another 
note or an amendment to the MIM was necessary for the 
Deluxe Motel in Slidell to serve as security for the FGB 
loan to MHS.235  
The court further stated, “the major advantage of the multiple 
indebtedness mortgage . . . is that [it] is much easier and simpler to 
use. To create a multiple indebtedness mortgage, the borrower 
must execute only one document, the multiple indebtedness 
mortgage agreement itself.”236  
Finally the court rejected the debtor’s argument that Bhula did 
not have authority to agree on behalf of Hari Aum that the debtor’s 
existing Louisiana Mortgage would additionally secure FGB’s 
subsequent Mississippi Loan to MHS. The court noted that Bhula 
was the sole owner/member of Hari Aum (a single-member limited 
liability company) and thus clearly had the right, power, and 
authority to bind his own company.237  
3. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision  
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in 
Hari Aum in favor of FGB. The primary argument that the debtor 
made before the Fifth Circuit was that FGB’s failure to file the 
Acknowledgement and the MHS April 2009 refinancing note in 
the St. Tammany Parish mortgage records somehow violated the 
Louisiana public records doctrine.238 The debtor argued that the 
Acknowledgement modified the mortgage and therefore was 
required to be recorded in the public mortgage records in order to 
                                                                                                             
 235. Id. at *4 (quoting Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 
1, at 51).  
 236. Id. The fact that Hari Aum subsequently agreed under the “waiver” 
language of the Acknowledgement to be solidarily liable on the MHS Mississippi 
Loan along with MHS, made it unnecessary for the parties to formally amend the 
Louisiana Mortgage. Reason: the Louisiana Mortgage already provided that the 
mortgaged property would secure third party debt for which Hari Aum was 
personally obligated. 
 237. Id. at *6–7.  
 238. In re Hari Aum, 714 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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be effective as against third persons.239 In rejecting Hari Aum’s 
public record doctrine argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded: 
Just as the amendments to the mortgages and promissory 
notes in KeyBank did not require recordation, neither the 
Acknowledgement nor the 2009 MHS [refinancing] 
promissory note here required recordation, as long as these 
alternations did not exceed the total indebtedness permitted 
under the pre-existing 2005 MIM [$50 million], which they 
did not. Indeed it would be counter-intuitive to require that the 
Acknowledgement be recorded, as a mere pledge of an 
existing, unaltered mortgage, while amendments to a 
mortgage would not need to be recorded. As the Comments to 
Article 3298 clearly state, “Once recorded . . . (the mortgage 
securing future obligations) serves notice to the world that, 
until released or cancelled, it encumbers the property it 
describes to secure the obligations it contemplates.” 240 
The Fifth Circuit finally concluded: 
Hari Aum’s arguments that additional documents needed to 
be recorded are red herrings. There is no new mortgage here. 
Moreover, based on the structure of the MIMs under the 
Civil Code and related statutes, the bankruptcy court is correct 
that “[m]any, if not all, of the [Hari Aum’s] arguments are 
inapplicable if the MIM is compared to and recognized to be 
an improvement of, the collateral mortgage/pledge agreement 
previously used by banks and other lenders in Louisiana.” As 
Hari Aum validly agreed to be jointly and severally liable for 
MHS’s loan and to secure MHS’s loan with the MIM, that 
loan simply constitutes part of Hari Aum’s future 
“Indebtedness” that the 2005 MIM contemplates. As a result, 
the MIM and, thus, the Deluxe Motel, secures MHS’s loan 
from FGB.241 
4. Significance of Hari Aum  
The Hari Aum decisions are significant because Hari Aum is the 
first reported case to fully consider the impact of the 1991 
comprehensive mortgage revisions on the ability of mortgage lenders 
to use a single mortgage instrument (e.g., a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage) to secure present and future loans, loan advances, and other 
                                                                                                             
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 288–89 (citations omitted). 
 241. Id. at 289. 
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cross-collateralized debts on a retroactive priority basis, without going 
through the contrivance of having the mortgagor execute a fictitious 
collateral mortgage note and then pledging that note to secure the 
mortgagor’s true indebtedness. Although multiple indebtedness 
mortgages have been authorized since January 1, 1992, when the 
Civil Code mortgage revisions first took effect, until 2011 when 
Hari Aum and the KeyBank cases were decided, there had been 
no judicial recognition of the ability of multiple indebtedness 
mortgages to directly secure multiple present and future 
indebtedness under a single instrument. As Louisiana State Law 
Institute 1991 Revision Comment (a) to Civil Code article 3298 
affirms, multiple indebtedness mortgages are intended to 
“provide a direct and convenient substitute for the so called 
collateral mortgage,” with the same legal consequences and the 
same retroactive priority rights as old style collateral mortgages, 
but on a more modern and easier to achieve, direct basis. The 
Hari Aum and Key Bank decisions recognized, expanded upon, 
and most importantly, blessed this result. 242 
5. Critique of Hari Aum  
The result reached by the Bankruptcy Court and by the Fifth 
Circuit in Hari Aum is correct under both the law and the facts of 
the case. Nonetheless, the Hari Aum decisions are not free from 
criticism.  
A glaring error contained in both the Bankruptcy Court and the 
Fifth Circuit opinions in Hari Aum is the unfortunate misuse of the 
term “pledge” to describe Bhula and Hari Aum’s subsequent 
agreement that Hari Aum’s existing Louisiana Mortgage would 
additionally secure the MHS Mississippi Loan.243 As the Bankruptcy 
Court stated in its opinion, “Hari Aum has mortgaged its property and 
pledged that mortgage to secure the debts of MHS to FGB.”244 As the 
Fifth Circuit further stated, “the Resolution, the Acknowledgement, 
and MHS’s 2009 [refinancing] note clearly illustrate Hari Aum’s 
agreement to pledge the MIM to secure MHS’s loan.”245 The Fifth 
                                                                                                             
 242. Certain practitioners and mortgage lenders have refused to use multiple 
indebtedness mortgages in place of old-style collateral mortgages until such time 
as they were satisfied that multiple indebtedness mortgages had been properly vetted 
before the courts. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 
52. Hopefully, the Hari Aum and KeyBank decisions will satisfy even the most 
overly cautious attorneys and mortgage lenders that multiple indebtedness 
mortgages do in fact work as described. 
 243. In re Hari Aum, 2011 WL 2746149, at *4.  
 244. Id. (emphasis added). 
 245. In re Hari Aum, 714 F.3d at 288 (emphasis added). 
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Circuit further mis-cited former Civil Code article 3133 as 
authority for the position that Hari Aum pledged its existing 
mortgage to FGB.246 As previously discussed in this Article,247 
Louisiana UCC Article 9 replaced the pledge articles of the 
Louisiana Civil Code with respect to post-1989 pledges of 
collateral subject to Louisiana UCC Article 9 security interests.248 
The Fifth Circuit failed to recognize this very important and 
significant change in the law. 
It is incorrect to say that a person can “pledge” a mortgage to 
secure another person’s debt. The correct term is that a person 
“grants” a mortgage or that a person “mortgages its property” to 
secure third-party debt. The reason why it is important to use 
correct terminology when describing the effects of certain 
commercial financing transactions is to guard against practitioners 
and judges being confused as to which laws and legal precedents 
apply and which do not apply as a result of having been superseded 
by subsequent legislation or intervening judicial decisions. As 
more fully discussed in Part V of this Article, the greatest risk 
faced by practitioners and mortgage lenders who continue to use 
old-style collateral mortgages is a tendency of litigators and the 
courts to mis-cite and misapply the Civil Code pledge articles and 
the pre-1990 collateral mortgage decisions thereunder249 to post-
1989 UCC secured transactions. To repeat, the pledge articles of 
the Civil Code no longer apply to post-1989 UCC pledges of 
collateral, which are now (since January 1, 1990) exclusively 
subject to Louisiana UCC Article 9.  
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Hari Aum also can be criticized 
to the extent that the court may have held that a multiple 
indebtedness mortgage must contain a specific reference to the fact 
that the mortgage is being granted pursuant to Civil Code article 
3298.250 Although it is good practice for the mortgage agreement 
to reference article 3298, such a reference is in no way required. 
A third comment (not rising to criticism) involves the Bankruptcy 
Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the waiver language 
included in Bhula’s and Hari Aum’s April 2009 Acknowledgement 
                                                                                                             
 246. Id. (emphasis added). 
 247. See supra Part I.C.1.  
 248. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133.1 (1990) (enacted by Act No. 137, 1989 
La. Acts 527). 
 249. See, e.g., Tex. Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667, 671 (La. 
1984); New Orleans Silversmiths v. Toups, 366 So. 2d 1299, 1303 (La. 1978); 
First Guaranty Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299, 1303 (La. 1978); Citizens Nat’l 
Bank v. Coates, 563 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Odom v. Cherokee 
Homes, 165 So. 2d 855, 865 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
 250. In re Hari Aum, 714 F.3d at 283. 
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somehow expressed Bhula’s and Hari Aum’s agreement that Hari 
Aum would be jointly, severally, and solidarily liable along with 
MHS for MHS’s Mississippi Loan indebtedness to FGB.251 It again 
must be noted that Hari Aum never signed a separate guaranty 
agreement personally guaranteeing MHS’s Mississippi Loan to 
FGB. The only evidence of Hari Aum’s agreement to be solidarily 
obligated on the Mississippi Loan was a vague reference to Hari 
Aum’s assumption of personal liability contained in the waiver 
section of the Hari Aum Acknowledgement. This purported personal 
liability agreement on the part of Hari Aum thus triggered the cross-
collateralization provisions of Hari Aum’s Louisiana Mortgage, 
thereby resulting in the Hari Aum Louisiana Mortgage securing 
MHS’s Mississippi Loan on a third-party mortgage basis.  
It was extremely fortunate for FGB that Bhula agreed to sign the 
Acknowledgement in April 2009 when the Hari Aum loan and the 
MHS Loan were being refinanced. Furthermore, it was fortunate for 
FGB that the waiver section of the LaserPro Acknowledgement 
form contains personal liability language, without which the 
Bankruptcy Court and the Fifth Circuit could have reached a 
different result.252 The cross-collateralization language of the Hari 
Aum Louisiana Mortgage agreement clearly was limited to securing 
third-party debt for which Hari Aum also was personally liable on a 
joint, several, and solidary basis. But for the personal liability 
language of the Acknowledgement, Hari Aum arguably would not 
have been personally liable on the MHS debt, and the MHS 
Mississippi Loan would not have been secured by the Hari Aum 
Louisiana Mortgage. 
FGB’s conduct also can be criticized on a 20–20 hindsight basis. 
FGB could have avoided what turned out to be a close call by 
requiring Hari Aum to personally guarantee the MHS Mississippi 
Loan either at the time the Mississippi Loan was funded in May 
2006 or in April 2009 when the Mississippi Loan was refinanced. 
FGB also could have insisted that the Hari Aum Louisiana 
Mortgage be amended to provide that the mortgage additionally 
secured the MHS Mississippi Loan on a third-party mortgage basis. 
Either of these steps could have avoided what turned out to be a 
long and costly lesson for FGB even though FGB ultimately 
prevailed in the Bankruptcy Court and before the Fifth Circuit. 
                                                                                                             
 251. See supra note 225. As previously discussed, it appears that Bhula may 
have previously agreed that the Hari Aum Louisiana Mortgage would additionally 
secure MHS’s subsequent Mississippi Loan at the time Bhula accepted FGB’s 
Mississippi Loan commitment in May 2006. See supra text accompanying note 
234.   
 252. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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6. Question Raised by Hari Aum: Is It Necessary or Good 
Practice for the Mortgagor to Execute an Acknowledgement of 
Mortgage Each Time that an Additional Advance is Made?253  
It certainly was beneficial and fortuitous to FGB that Bhula 
agreed to sign an Acknowledgement form at the time the Hari 
Aum loan and the MHS Mississippi Loan were refinanced in April 
2009. As previously discussed,254 but for the personal liability 
language of the Acknowledgement, the Bankruptcy Court and the 
Fifth Circuit could have held in favor of the debtor and against 
FGB on the basis that the clear language of the Louisiana 
Mortgage was limited to securing third-party debt for which Hari 
Aum also was personally obligated. 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the obvious importance of Hari 
Aum’s Acknowledgement in this case, there is no requirement 
whatsoever that the mortgagor agree, concur, affirm, or 
acknowledge each time a future loan or advance is made that such 
a loan or advance is secured by the mortgagor’s then-existing 
multiple indebtedness mortgage. This again assumes that the 
mortgage agreement contains broadly drafted future advance/cross-
collateralization language such as included in the FGB LaserPro 
mortgage and such as suggested in Part III.D.2 of this Article. Any 
thought that there must be some type of contemporaneous 
manifestation of intent or affirmation255 that a subsequent loan 
advance be secured by an existing multiple indebtedness mortgage is 
completely misplaced and is an obvious vestige of the Citizens 
National Bank v. Coates decision, which was legislatively overruled 
by the 1989 UCC Implementation Bill,256 and which has no 
applicability whatsoever to Louisiana multiple indebtedness 
mortgages.257  
                                                                                                             
 253. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 57. 
 254. See supra note 252.  
 255. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 47 
(discussing non-Louisiana UCC cases holding to this effect). 
 256. See id. at 27–30 (discussing the legislative correction of Coates under 
the 1989 UCC Implementation Bill). 
 257. See supra note 209. 
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B. KeyBank National Association v. Perkins Rowe Associates, 
LLC 
1. Facts and Disposition  
The facts of the KeyBank National Association v. Perkins Rowe 
Associates, LLC258 case are as follows. Perkins Rowe is a multi-
use, commercial and residential, multi-million dollar development 
in South Baton Rouge (the “Project”). The developer, Perkins 
Rowe Associates, LLC, and related entities (collectively “PRA”), 
sought to obtain interim construction financing and initially 
contacted Wachovia Bank, N.A., (Wachovia) and other potential 
lenders, including KeyBank National Association (KeyBank). In 
anticipation of obtaining financing, and to permit the construction 
lender or lending group to have a first priority mortgage ahead of 
potentially competing contractors, subcontractors, and material 
suppliers asserting liens under the Louisiana Private Works Act,259 
PRA granted a Louisiana multiple indebtedness mortgage on the 
Project in favor of Wachovia (the “Wachovia Mortgage”).260 The 
Wachovia Mortgage purported to secure PRA’s future indebtedness 
in favor of Wachovia and its successors and assigns up to a 
maximum amount outstanding of $200 million. The Wachovia 
Mortgage was recorded in the East Baton Rouge Parish mortgage 
records on September 14, 2005, prior to commencement of work on 
the Project.261 PRA executed a $1,000 token, demand promissory 
note in favor of Wachovia as the named mortgagee (the “Wachovia 
Note”) at the time that the Wachovia Mortgage was signed.262 PRA 
subsequently granted a separate multiple indebtedness mortgage in 
favor of JTS Realty Services, L.L.C. (JTS). This separate mortgage 
(the “JTS Mortgage”) purported to secure PRA’s present and future 
indebtedness in favor of JTS and its successors and assigns up to a 
maximum of $20 million. The JTS Mortgage was recorded in the 
East Baton Rouge Parish mortgage records on April 25, 2006, again 
prior to commencement of work, which was delayed due to the 
effects of Hurricane Katrina. PRA executed a $10,000 demand note 
in favor of JTS (the “JTS Note”) at the time that the JTS Mortgage 
                                                                                                             
 258. 823 F. Supp. 2d 399 (M.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 407 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 259. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (Supp. 2015).  
 260. KeyBank, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 403. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
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was signed.263 Neither Wachovia nor JTS ever funded any money 
to PRA under their respective mortgage notes.264  
In July 2006, PRA completed negotiations with KeyBank, which 
resulted in KeyBank committing to make a $170 million interim 
construction loan to PRA. On July 21, 2006, KeyBank either 
purchased or accepted the assignment of Wachovia’s lien position 
under the then-recorded Wachovia Mortgage.265 This was done in 
order for construction loan advances to be funded by KeyBank to 
have priority over the competing rights of lien creditors filing 
construction related liens against the Project under the Louisiana 
Private Works Act. On the same date, KeyBank acquired JTS’s lien 
rights under the JTS Mortgage. KeyBank then consolidated the 
Wachovia Mortgage and the JTS Mortgage into a single amended 
and restated multiple indebtedness mortgage (the “KeyBank 
Mortgage”).266 The KeyBank Mortgage contained an anti-novation 
clause under which PRA agreed and acknowledged that PRA’s 
execution of the KeyBank Mortgage was not intended to effectuate, 
and did not result in, novation or complete replacement of PRA’s 
obligations and agreements under the prior Wachovia Mortgage and 
the prior JTS Mortgage.267 The consolidated KeyBank Mortgage 
provided that the mortgage secured PRA’s present and future 
indebtedness in favor of KeyBank up to a maximum amount 
outstanding of $500 million, which represented an increase of $280 
million over the $200 million prior credit limit of the Wachovia 
Mortgage and the $20 million prior credit limit of the JTS 
Mortgage. The consolidated KeyBank Mortgage was recorded in 
the East Baton Rouge Parish mortgage records in July 2006 after 
construction had commenced on the Project. PRA also executed a 
substitute mortgage note in favor of KeyBank evidencing PRA’s 
$170 million construction loan.268 
PRA later experienced financial difficulty over the course of 
construction and development of the Project, leaving a number of 
unpaid contractors, subcontractors, and materials suppliers who 
filed construction liens under the Private Works Act. ThornCo, 
L.L.C. (Thorn), a subcontractor on the Project, was one of the 
unpaid lien creditors. PRA subsequently filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy relief from creditors, and Thorn commenced litigation 
against KeyBank claiming that Thorn’s construction lien against 
                                                                                                             
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 404, 406–08. 
 265. Id. at 404. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 404, 408–10. 
 268. Id. at 404.  
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the Project was entitled to priority over the competing rights of 
KeyBank under the KeyBank Mortgage. The matter was ultimately 
decided by the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Louisiana in an opinion dated October 11, 2011, in which the 
court held in KeyBank’s favor.269 Thorn then appealed that 
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
which affirmed the lower court’s decision in an unpublished per 
curiam opinion.270 
2. The District Court’s Decision 
Thorn made a number of arguments before the district court: (1) 
the Wachovia Note was an obvious sham that was never intended to 
produce legal results;271 (2) Wachovia’s failure to lend money to 
PRA under the Wachovia Note resulted in the Wachovia Mortgage 
being unenforceable for failure of cause (consideration);272 (3) the 
Wachovia Note and Mortgage were simulations under Louisiana 
law and therefore of no effect as to third persons (including 
Thorn);273 (4) the Wachovia Mortgage was ineffective because 
Wachovia never accepted the Mortgage in its capacity as 
mortgagee;274 (5) the consolidation of the Wachovia Mortgage and 
the JTS Mortgage into a single consolidated KeyBank Mortgage 
resulted in a novation and completely new mortgage that was not 
entitled to retroactive ranking priority vis-à-vis competing third 
persons (including Thorn) back to the date that the Wachovia 
Mortgage was first recorded (September 14, 2005);275 (6) the 
increase in the maximum secured amount of the KeyBank 
Mortgage (to $500 million from $220 million under the combined 
Wachovia Mortgage and JTS Mortgage) had the effect of 
triggering the applicability of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
9:5390(B),276 resulting in the reprioritization of the KeyBank 
Mortgage from September 14, 2005, the date the Wachovia 
Mortgage was originally filed of record, to July 2006 when the 
KeyBank Mortgage was recorded;277 and (7) the Wachovia 
Mortgage was recorded after work had begun on the Project in the 
                                                                                                             
 269. Id. at 404, 410–11. 
 270. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., 502 F. App’x 407 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 271. KeyBank, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08.  
 272. Id. at 406–07.  
 273. Id. at 407.  
 274. Id. at 406.  
 275. Id. at 408–10.  
 276. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5390(B) (2007). 
 277. KeyBank, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 410–11.  
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form of site preparation by Lemoine Company (Lemoine), the 
initial general contractor on the Project, thus resulting in the 
Wachovia Mortgage and later the consolidated KeyBank Mortgage 
ranking behind the competing claims of unpaid contractors, 
subcontractors, and materials suppliers (again including Thorn).278 
The court rejected all of Thorn’s arguments and ultimately held 
that the KeyBank Mortgage was entitled to ranking priority back to 
the September 2005 date on which the Wachovia Mortgage was 
originally recorded, ahead of Thorn’s Private Works Act 
construction lien on the Project.279 
The court initially analyzed the law that applied to the 
Wachovia and KeyBank multiple indebtedness mortgages. Quoting 
from the court’s opinion: 
This new version of mortgage has remarkable vitality, as 
the code envisions this mortgage exists from its creation 
“until it is terminated by the mortgagor or his successor” or 
“extinguished in some other lawful manner.” . . . In other 
words, absent affirmative termination of the mortgage . . . 
the mortgage may continue indefinitely. . . . Thus, “the 
mortgage is fully in existence, though its enforcement may 
be conditional.” . . . Moreover, “[a]s to all obligations, 
present and future, secured by a mortgage, notwithstanding 
the nature of such obligations or the date they arise, the 
mortgage has effect . . . as to third persons from the time 
the contract of mortgage is filed for registry. This provision 
“declares that a mortgage securing future obligations has 
the same effect and priority it would have if the obligations 
were in existence when the contract of mortgage was 
entered into.”280 
The court rejected Thorn’s argument that the Wachovia Note 
did not create a real obligation on the part of PRA so that the later 
assignment of the Wachovia Note and Mortgage created a sham 
transaction. As the court stated in its opinion: 
Article 3298 declares a policy demanding recognition of a 
mortgage at its date of recordation, regardless of when the 
obligation [that the mortgage secures] is actually incurred. Of 
course, the obligation must eventually arise for the mortgage 
to be enforceable. The Wachovia promissory note satisfies 
that requirement. While ThornCo argues no evidence exists 
                                                                                                             
 278. Id. at 411–15. 
 279. Id. at 415. 
 280. Id. at 405 (citations omitted). 
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that funds were ever lent [under the Wachovia Note], it cites 
no authority which establishes the handing-over of money as 
a prerequisite to incurring an obligation.281  
The court additionally rejected Thorn’s lack of funding/failure 
of cause argument, holding that, although Wachovia never lent 
funds to PRA on the Wachovia Note, the Wachovia Mortgage 
nevertheless remained valid because there was a reasonable 
expectation that Wachovia (or in this case, Wachovia’s assignee, 
KeyBank) might someday lend money to PRA secured by the 
mortgage, which is all that Civil Code article 3298 requires. As 
stated by the court: 
ThornCo argues the Wachovia mortgage could not be 
legally established because no obligation ever existed for 
which the mortgage could serve as security. Comment (a) 
to [Civil Code article 3298] clarifies that a mortgage to 
secure future obligations remains valid “even to secure 
obligations that may not then be contemplated by [the 
mortgagor] except in the broadest sense of an expectation that 
he may someday incur an obligation to the mortgagee.”282 
The court rejected Thorn’s simulation argument, holding that 
there was no simulation under the simulation articles of the 
Louisiana Civil Code.283 “While Wachovia’s loan never came to 
fruition, no evidence exists which tends to show the parties never 
intended the note and mortgage to have legal effect.”284  
The court further rejected Thorn’s argument that the Wachovia 
Mortgage was invalid because Wachovia never formally accepted 
the Mortgage in its capacity as mortgagee. The court cited Civil 
Code article 3289285 and the Expose Des Motifs to the 1991 Civil 
Code mortgage revisions as authority that acceptance of a 
mortgage is presumed under law, and there is no requirement that 
the mortgagee intervene under the act of mortgage to accept the 
benefits of the mortgage.286  
The court additionally rejected Thorn’s novation argument, 
holding that a novation, or the complete replacement of an existing 
                                                                                                             
 281. Id. at 408. The court was clearly wrong in holding that a debt obligation is 
created under an evidentiary promissory note without the lender actually 
advancing funds to the borrower. A promissory note is evidence of indebtedness, 
and unless and until the lender actually advances funds to the borrower, no 
indebtedness is ever created or exists, and the note is just a piece of paper. 
 282. Id. at 406–07. 
 283. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2025–2028 (2015). 
 284. KeyBank, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08. 
 285. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3289 (2015). 
 286. KeyBank, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 406. See also RUBIN, supra note 21, ¶ 12.6. 
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obligation with a new obligation,287 is never presumed and must be 
proved by clear and unequivocal evidence of the parties’ intent 
(citing Civil Code article 1880288 as authority). The court held that 
the anti-novation clause included in the KeyBank Mortgage was 
sufficient to evidence PRA and KeyBank’s intent that the 
consolidation of the Wachovia Mortgage and the JTS Mortgage 
into a single mortgage did not result in a novation of PRA’s prior 
obligations in favor of Wachovia and JTS.289 
The court further rejected Thorn’s increase in maximum secured 
amount/reprioritization argument, holding that the pertinent statute, 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5390(B), provides that, when a 
mortgage is amended to increase the maximum secured amount 
thereunder, the mortgage retains its original ranking priority vis-à-
vis third persons as to funds advanced to the mortgagor up to the 
original secured limit specified in the mortgage instrument and 
reranks (reprioritizes) from the date the amendment is filed of record 
only with respect to funds advanced that exceed the original secured 
amount.290 The court recognized that, although the KeyBank 
Mortgage provided for an increased $500 million secured amount 
limit (as compared to the prior $200 million maximum limit under 
                                                                                                             
 287. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1879 (2015) (defining novation). 
 288. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1880 (2015). 
 289. KeyBank, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 408–10. 
 290. Id. at 410–11. The following example illustrates the proper application 
of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5390(B): 
Bank makes a loan to ABC secured by a Louisiana multiple indebtedness 
mortgage on ABC’s property. The mortgage contains a $1 million maximum 
limitation on the amount of the secured indebtedness. Bank records ABC’s 
mortgage on June 1, 2014. Bank makes a $500,000 loan to ABC secured by the 
mortgage, which loan remains outstanding as of September 1, 2015. On that 
date, Bank makes an additional $2 million dollar loan to ABC and wants the 
additional $2 million loan to be secured by ABC’s existing mortgage. The $2.5 
million combined amounts of the first loan and the second loan exceed the 
maximum $1 million secured amount limitation under the mortgage, 
necessitating that the Bank and ABC agree to amend the mortgage to increase 
the maximum secured amount thereunder to $4 million, which they do. The 
mortgage amendment is filed on September 1, 2015. Under these facts, the 
mortgage ranks vis-à-vis potential competing third persons from the date of 
original recordation (June 1, 2014) only with respect to funds advanced to ABC 
up to the original $1 million maximum secured amount stipulated in the pre-
amended mortgage. The mortgage reranks (reprioritizes) with respect to 
additional amounts advanced to ABC that exceed the $1 million original 
maximum secured amount (in this case, $1.5 million) from the date the 
mortgage amendment is filed of record. In other words, the first $1 million 
advanced to ABC is secured by the mortgage on a ranking priority basis back to 
June 1, 2014, and all additional amounts advanced to ABC in excess of $1 
million rank from September 1, 2015, the date the mortgage amendment was 
filed of record. 
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the Wachovia Mortgage), the amount of KeyBank’s loan to PRA—
$170 million—clearly fell within the original $200 million secured 
credit limit of the Wachovia Mortgage. Therefore, there was no 
reranking (reprioritization) under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
9:5390(B) or otherwise.291 Quoting from the court’s opinion:  
The Court finds the amendments and modifications to the 
previous notes and mortgages were not invalid and did not 
defeat KeyBank’s right to use the date of the original 
Wachovia mortgage to determine its priority position. The 
Wachovia mortgage stated the maximum principal amount 
of the secured debt as $200 million, and KeyBank’s [loan] 
obligations never surpassed that amount. Therefore, La. 
R.S. 9:5390 is not implicated here.292 
Finally, the court rejected Thorn’s argument that the Wachovia 
Mortgage was filed in the mortgage records after work had 
commenced on the Project, thus resulting in the lien of the 
Wachovia Mortgage and the replacement KeyBank Mortgage 
being junior and inferior to Thorn’s competing lien priority rights 
as an unpaid subcontractor on the Project. The court held that the 
initial site preparation work began by Lemoine, the first general 
contractor on the Project, before Wachovia recorded its mortgage, 
“must be considered a separate ‘work.’”293 This meant that the 
Wachovia Mortgage was filed of record in a timely manner before 
other “work” commenced on the Project, thus resulting in the 
Wachovia Mortgage and the consolidated KeyBank Mortgage 
priming construction-related liens asserted against the Project 
under the Private Works Act.294 
3. Significance of the KeyBank Decision  
The KeyBank decision is significant because of the court’s tacit 
approval of a common practice by commercial real estate 
developers and construction lenders under which the developer 
grants a mortgage on the project before work commences, and 
often before the developer obtains a binding loan commitment 
from a lender to provide interim construction financing.295 The 
                                                                                                             
 291. KeyBank, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 411.  
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 413–14.  
 294. Id. at 414–15. 
 295. Typically, a developer obtains interim construction financing from a 
bank or other short-term lender to finance initial construction of a project. The 
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obvious purpose of granting and recording a mortgage before work 
commences is so that the construction lender’s mortgage will 
prime and have priority over the competing liens of contractors, 
subcontractors, and materials suppliers under Section 4821(A)(3) 
of the Louisiana Private Works Act, which is exactly what 
transpired in KeyBank.296 The identity of the interim construction 
lender is often unknown to the developer at the time the mortgage 
is executed and recorded, necessitating that the mortgage initially 
be granted in favor of a nominee or related person. The mortgagor 
also typically signs some type of promissory note in some nominal 
amount, payable to the named mortgagee on demand and secured 
by the mortgage. When an interim construction lender is identified 
and a binding loan commitment is issued, the initial note and 
mortgage are assigned by the named mortgagee to the construction 
lender, with the parties then amending and restating the mortgage 
to conform to the lender’s requirements. The initial note297 also is 
replaced with a substitute construction staged-advance note or a 
master note evidencing a secured line of credit. 
Three forms of mortgage may be used in connection with such 
interim construction loans: (1) a staged-advance mortgage, (2) a 
future advance collateral mortgage, and (3) a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage. Multiple indebtedness mortgages are the preferable form 
of mortgage to be used in a delayed, anticipatory funding situation 
such as described above. Unlike some non-self-replenishing, staged-
advance mortgages, multiple indebtedness mortgages are able to 
secure additional loan advances needed to complete the project, or 
that may otherwise exceed the original principal amount of the 
mortgage note, without the necessity of amending the mortgage to 
secure the additional outstanding amount.298 This is not possible 
under a closed-end, staged-advance mortgage.299 Multiple 
indebtedness mortgages also are superior to future advance collateral 
                                                                                                             
 
loan at the time that construction is completed and the constructed project is 
accepted by the owner.  
 296. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(a)(3) (Supp. 2015). 
 297. For the reasons more fully discussed in Part IV.B.4, it is good practice 
for the named mortgagee to fully fund the initial note prior to the transfer and 
assignment of the initial note and mortgage to the construction lender. In this 
way, the construction lender arguably can avoid the naked assignment issue 
faced by KeyBank. 
 298. This assumes that the maximum secured credit limit under the mortgage 
is sufficiently large to secure the increased loan amount. 
 299. A closed-end mortgage secures only the debt evidenced by the mortgage 
note, and does not contractually provide that the mortgage will additionally secure 
other future indebtedness on a future advance/cross-collateralization basis. 
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mortgages because a multiple indebtedness mortgage takes its ranking 
priority vis-à-vis competing third persons—in this case, contractors, 
subcontractors, and materials suppliers—from the time the mortgage 
is recorded in the public mortgage records, which, if timed correctly, 
can be before work commences on the project. By way of 
comparison, a future advance collateral mortgage takes its ranking 
priority from the later in time of mortgage recordation or the time an 
initial advance is funded under the secured loan, or a binding 
commitment to lend is issued, which can be weeks and even months 
after the mortgage is recorded and after work on the project has 
commenced. Additionally, multiple indebtedness mortgages are able 
to secure indefinite future loans and advances so long as there is a 
reasonable expectation on the part of the mortgagor that one day 
the mortgagor might obtain a loan from the named mortgagee, or 
from the named mortgagee’s successor or assign, whether the 
identity of the ultimate lender is known or unknown to the 
mortgagor at the time the mortgage is granted. 
4. Question: Can Mortgage Priority Rights be Transferred on a 
Naked Assignment Basis Independently of the Secured Debt?  
A concern has been raised by certain practitioners and legal 
scholars that the court did not thoroughly consider the following 
two questions when deciding the KeyBank case: (1) whether 
KeyBank could have validly accepted the transfer of security and 
priority rights under the Wachovia Mortgage on a “naked 
assignment” basis without also acquiring the outstanding PRA 
indebtedness secured thereby, and (2) whether KeyBank could 
have validly acquired rights under the Wachovia Mortgage in light 
of the fact that nothing was owed under the Wachovia Note at the 
time of the purported assignment. These are not trivial concerns 
because it is feared that, if unchecked, the naked assignment 
implications of the KeyBank decision could lead to the trafficking 
of mortgage lien positions,300 thus potentially undermining the 
basic principle of Louisiana mortgage law that mortgages rank in 
priority to one another in the order of their recordation.301 
                                                                                                             
 300. Mortgage priority rights are not commodities that can be sold or traded 
from one mortgage lender to another.  
 301. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3307(3) (2015). It clearly is permissible for mortgage 
holders to contractually agree among themselves to subordinate lien positions. 
For example, assume that there are three mortgage holders with competing 
mortgages on the same property. MH1 is the first to file, MH2 is second, and 
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priority lien position to MH2’s second priority mortgage, in which event MH2’s 
mortgage priority rights will come ahead of MH1’s subordinated rights. MH3 
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Recall that KeyBank acquired the Wachovia Mortgage for no 
or nominal consideration at a time when nothing was owed under 
the Wachovia Note. In fact, nothing was ever owed under the 
Wachovia Note, which was for a nominal $1,000 amount and 
totally unfunded. The obvious purpose of KeyBank acquiring the 
Wachovia Mortgage was to allow KeyBank to advance funds to 
PRA under PRA’s $170 million construction loan secured by the 
lien of the consolidated KeyBank Mortgage with retroactive 
ranking priority vis-à-vis competing third persons back to 
September 14, 2005, which was the day that the Wachovia 
Mortgage was originally recorded in the East Baton Rouge Parish 
mortgage records. It was critical that KeyBank be able to latch on 
to Wachovia’s earlier September 2005 mortgage filing date in 
order for the KeyBank Mortgage to have ranking priority over the 
rights of unpaid contractors, subcontractors, and materials 
suppliers filing construction related liens against the Project under 
the Louisiana Private Works Act. As previously stated, a real estate 
construction mortgage has priority over the competing rights of 
unpaid contractors, subcontractors, and materials suppliers under 
section 4821(A)(3) of the Private Works Act only if and when the 
mortgage is filed of record and thereby becomes effective against 
third persons before work commences on the project. The 
Wachovia Mortgage was recorded in September 2005 before work 
commenced, and the consolidated KeyBank Mortgage was 
recorded in July 2006 after work had started. Had KeyBank not 
been able to acquire the Wachovia Mortgage and to latch on to its 
earlier September 2005 filing date, KeyBank’s mortgage lien rights 
against the Project would have been inferior to the competing 
rights of Thorn and other similarly situated lien creditors, and 
KeyBank likely would not have agreed to make the loan. 
Those practitioners and legal scholars who have expressed 
concern over the naked assignment implications of the KeyBank 
decision have questioned whether it is permissible under Louisiana 
law to assign security and priority lien rights under a recorded 
Louisiana mortgage without also transferring—by purchase or 
otherwise—rights to the debt that the mortgage secures, i.e., a 
naked assignment. As a follow-up question, can a mortgage be 
assigned when there is no outstanding secured mortgage debt at the 
                                                                                                             
 
will remain in third position. However, what if MH3 wants to come ahead of 
both MH1 and MH2, and MH2 will not agree to subordinate. The question 
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time of assignment, or when there never was any debt secured by 
the mortgage in the first place?  
The answers to these questions are found under the assignment of 
rights302 and mortgage303 articles of the Louisiana Civil Code. Civil 
Code article 3282 states that “[a] mortgage is accessory to the 
obligation it secures.”304 Article 2645 provides that “[t]he assignment 
of a right also includes its accessories such as security rights.”305 
Article 3312 additionally provides that “[t]he transfer of an obligation 
secured by a mortgage includes the transfer of the mortgage.”306 
Reading these three articles together, it then follows that, if and when 
a transferee acquires the mortgage debt from the then-debt owner, 
the transferee automatically acquires the transferor’s security and 
priority ranking rights under the mortgage without further 
formality.307 In other words, the mortgage follows the debt. But 
can the transferee acquire rights under the mortgage without also 
acquiring the mortgage debt, and can the transferee acquire rights 
under the mortgage if and when there is no mortgage debt? The 
answer to both questions is “no.” There is nothing under the 
Louisiana Civil Code or otherwise that would permit the 
independent transfer and assignment of security and priority rights 
under a recorded mortgage without a simultaneous, corresponding 
transfer and assignment of rights to and under the secured debt. In 
other words, there can be no assignment of mortgage rights in 
Louisiana without the assignee also acquiring rights to the secured 
debt from the then-debt owner. It further follows that there can be no 
transfer and assignment of mortgage rights when there is no secured 
debt owed to the debt owner at the time the assignment takes place, 
because there is no debt to assign for the mortgage to then follow. It 
appears to make no difference whether the assignee also accepts the 
assignment of a promissory note purporting to evidence the 
mortgage debt so long as nothing is owed under the mortgage note 
at the time of its assignment. This again is what happened in 
KeyBank. A promissory note is a writing that evidences a debt 
                                                                                                             
 302. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2642–2654 (2015). 
 303. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3278–3298 (2015). 
 304. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3282 (2015). 
 305. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2645 (2015). 
 306. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3312 (2015). 
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the mortgage records in order to place third persons on public notice that the 
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obligation, assuming that an outstanding indebtedness exists. If and 
when there is no debt, a promissory note is just a piece of paper.308  
Although the court mentioned the assignment of rights 
provisions of Civil Code articles 2342 and 2345 on two occasions 
in its opinion,309 there is nothing in the KeyBank opinion or 
otherwise to indicate that the court ever considered whether 
KeyBank could validly succeed to Wachovia’s security and 
priority rights under the Wachovia Mortgage on a naked 
assignment basis at a time when nothing was owed to Wachovia. It 
appears that the naked assignment issue either was never raised by 
Thorn or the debtor or that the Court simply accepted this result 
without comment.310  
Although there are no Louisiana naked assignment mortgage 
cases on point, a number of UCC cases, including a Louisiana 
case, Barcosh, Ltd. v. Dumas,311 have considered whether naked 
assignments of the lien priority rights under file-perfected UCC 
security interests are permissible without the assignee also 
acquiring the underlying secured indebtedness from the assigning 
secured party.312 The majority of these cases have concluded that 
UCC file-perfected priority rights cannot be assigned on a naked 
assignment basis independently of the obligations they secure,313 
while other cases have held that the practice of “leapfrogging” 
UCC secured priority positions is a permissible, although frowned 
                                                                                                             
 308. The assignment of rights articles of the Louisiana Civil Code generally 
do not apply to transfers and assignments of promissory notes, which instead are 
subject to Article 3 of the Louisiana UCC. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:3-101 
(1994). 
 309. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., 823 F. Supp. 2d 399, 
406, 408 (M.D. La. 2011).  
 310. The court did consider the fact that Wachovia never lent any funds to 
PRA under the original Wachovia Note when considering whether the lack of 
funding somehow had an effect on the validity of the Wachovia Mortgage as a 
viable mortgage instrument. Id. at 406–07. There is no reason to believe, 
however, that the court ever considered the completely different question raised 
here as to whether Wachovia’s lack of funding had a negative effect on the 
ability of Wachovia to assign its security and lien priority rights under the 
Wachovia Mortgage to KeyBank on a naked assignment basis.  
 311. Barcosh, Ltd. v. Dumas, No. 06–616–JJB, 2010 WL 3172984 (M.D. La. 
Aug. 11, 2010) (holding that a UCC security interest cannot be assigned without 
also assigning the secured debt).   
 312. See generally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 2.16 (3d. ed. A.S. Pratt 2014).  
 313. See In re Leisure Time Sports, Inc., 194 B.R. 859 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1992); In re Belize Airways, Ltd., 7 B.R. 604 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).  
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upon, application of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of UCC section 
9-322(a)(1).314 
The Barcosh case is noteworthy because it was decided by the 
same federal district judge who decided the KeyBank case, 
although admittedly in a different, but related, context. The court in 
Barcosh was called upon to decide whether Regions Bank, as 
successor by merger to Union Planters Bank, had the right to latch 
on to a prior Union Planters’ first filed UCC-1 financing statement 
to leapfrog ahead of Barcosh’s later-in-time UCC filing. The court 
rejected Regions’ contention that it gained the benefit of the Union 
Planters’ first-in-time filing as a result of the merger of Union 
Planters into Regions. The court reasoned that priority rights under 
Union Planters’ first-filed UCC-1 financing statement did not 
transfer to Regions “because there was no indebtedness to maintain 
a security interest at the time of the merger”315—in other words, a 
naked assignment. 
Although Barcosh involved a naked assignment of a filed 
UCC-1 financing statement, and KeyBank involved a naked 
mortgage assignment, the same Louisiana Civil Code assignment-
of-rights principles discussed above should apply in both related 
circumstances. That being said, Louisiana law does not permit 
naked transfers and assignments of security and priority rights 
under mortgages as well as under the Louisiana UCC without the 
transferee also acquiring the secured indebtedness from the 
transferor, and if there is no secured debt at that time, no transfer 
and assignment of security rights is possible. Naked assignments of 
lien priority rights under file-perfected UCC security interests, 
such as occurred in Barcosh, are directly analogous to naked 
assignments of priority rights under recorded real estate mortgages, 
which is what occurred in KeyBank. It is difficult to explain why 
the court may have held one way in Barcosh and another way in 
KeyBank other than to speculate that the naked assignment issue 
was not raised or argued before the court in KeyBank.316 
                                                                                                             
 314. The practice of trafficking in UCC secured positions has been criticized 
by both practitioners and legal scholars as violating the UCC requirement of 
good faith and fair dealing as provided in UCC 1-203. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10:1-203 (Supp. 2015) (Louisiana enactment); CLARK, supra note 312, ¶ 2.16; 
see, e.g., In re Camp Town, Inc., 197 B.R. 139 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1996).  
 315. Barcosh, 2010 WL 3172984, at *1. 
 316. The naked assignment of mortgage issue was not discussed in the 
KeyBank opinion leading to doubt whether this issue was ever raised before the 
Court. In addition, Barcosh is not an easily found opinion, and is available only 
through Westlaw, and discoverable though a vague footnote in the Clark UCC 
treatise. See CLARK, supra note 312, ¶ 2.16, at 2-153 n.441.  
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With the benefit of 20–20 hindsight, KeyBank arguably could 
have avoided the above discussed naked assignment issue by 
having Wachovia fund the $1,000 amount of the Wachovia Note 
before the assignment took place, and then purchasing the 
Wachovia Note from Wachovia for $1,000. This strategy arguably 
would have worked to avoid a naked transfer of the Wachovia 
Mortgage, assuming that the court agreed (as it did) that a $1,000 
note was a sufficient amount to initially establish mortgage priority 
in connection with a $170 million construction loan.317 
5. Additional Concerns 
An additional concern has been raised by practitioners and 
legal scholars that the ability of a mortgagor to grant a multiple 
indebtedness mortgage on an uncertain, anticipatory basis before 
the identity of the ultimate mortgage lender is determined can lead 
to abusive practices where a mortgagor may attempt to shield its 
assets from the claims of creditors by granting a mortgage on its 
property in favor of a related mortgagee under what is commonly 
referred to as a “brother-in-law” mortgage. While this type of 
abusive practice can certainly be attempted, there appear to be 
adequate remedies available under law that can effectively counter 
any such attempted fraud on creditors, including actions based under 
the simulation318 and revocatory action319 articles of the Louisiana 
Civil Code, and the voidable preference320 and fraudulent 
conveyance321 sections of the Bankruptcy Code. The language of 
Louisiana State Law Institute 1991 Revision Comment (a) to Civil 
Code article 3298 confirming that a person may grant a multiple 
indebted mortgage to secure indefinite future obligations “that may 
not be then contemplated by [the mortgagor] except in the broadest 
sense of an expectation that he may someday incur an obligation to 
the mortgagee,” must be read and applied within the context of a 
person’s overriding obligation to act in good faith and to deal fairly 
                                                                                                             
 317. There is an ancient principle under common law contracts that a 
“peppercorn” is sufficient consideration to bind an obligor to a contractual 
undertaking. Suffice it to say that a $1,000 unfunded note was sufficient 
consideration in the Court’s opinion to bind PRA under what turned out to be a 
$170 million construction mortgage in the same way a peppercorn is sufficient 
to bind a contract at common law. 
 318. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2025–2028 (2015). 
 319. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2036–2043 (2015). 
 320. 11 U.S.C. § 543 (2012). 
 321. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
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with others.322 Fraudulently shielding one’s assets from the claims 
of creditors simply is not permitted  
C. JAB of Oakdale, LLC v. Oakwood Inn Development Corp.323 
1. Facts and Disposition  
On December 12, 2003, Oakwood Inn Development Corp. 
(Oakwood) granted a Louisiana multiple indebtedness mortgage to 
secure loans and other funding to be extended to Oakwood by JAB 
of Oakdale, LLC (JAB). The Oakwood mortgage agreement 
provided that the mortgage secured “any and all present and future 
loans, extensions of credit, liabilities and obligations of every 
nature and kind that I [referring to Oakwood] may now and/or in 
the future owe to or incur in favor of mortgagee [referring to JAB], 
including without limitation, the loan evidenced by my promissory 
note dated, this date of signing, in the amount of $103,000.”324 
JAB never made this $103,000 loan or any other loan to Oakwood, 
but instead extended credit to Hab Karam and Amy Karam (the 
“Karams”) in their individual capacities and to Hab Karam 
Construction Company (HKC), which was another company owned 
by the Karams. JAB later sued Oakwood to enforce the Oakwood 
mortgage presumably to secure unpaid amounts owed to JAB by the 
Karams personally and by HKC. The trial court held in favor of 
Oakwood, and JAB then appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. 
2. The Third Circuit Decision  
The Third Circuit ruled in an unpublished opinion that, under 
the express language of the mortgage, the Oakwood mortgage 
secured only loans and other obligations owed by Oakwood to 
JAB, and did not secure other debts owed by the Karams in their 
individual capacities, and by HKC.325  
                                                                                                             
 322. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2015) 
(“Contracts must be performed in good faith.”); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
10:1-203 (Supp. 2015). “Every contract or duty within this Title [10 of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
and enforcement.” See also Stuckey, supra note 58, at 803. 
 323. JAB of Oakdale, LLC v. Oakwood Inn Dev. Corp., No. 07-1426, 2008 
WL 597193 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008). 
  324. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
 325. Id. 
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V. ARE COLLATERAL MORTGAGES OBSOLETE?  
The 1994 Bar Journal Article asked the question “is the 
collateral mortgage obsolete?”326 The answer to that question, both 
today and 20 years ago, is “no.” Collateral mortgages remain 
available as viable and enforceable, open-end mortgage instruments, 
even though collateral mortgages are no longer the sole, or even the 
preferred, form of open-end mortgage available to Louisiana lending 
lawyers and their clients. More and more practitioners and mortgage 
lenders are using multiple indebtedness mortgages in place of old-
style collateral mortgages, particularly since multiple indebtedness 
mortgages have now been tested before the courts in Hari Aum, 
KeyBank, and JAB of Oakdale. Additionally, there have been 
hundreds of multiple indebtedness mortgage foreclosures since 
1992, none of which has yet to result in a reported decision 
challenging the ability to foreclose under a multiple indebtedness 
mortgage using Louisiana executory process foreclosure procedures. 
The Louisiana State Law Institute and its Security Device 
Committee declared their intent that multiple indebtedness 
mortgages be a direct and convenient substitute for the so-called 
collateral mortgage,327 and multiple indebtedness mortgages have 
successfully proved to be just that. 
The advantages of using multiple indebtedness mortgages to 
secure revolving lines of credit and other future cross-
collateralized debt are clear and irrefutable. First, multiple 
indebtedness mortgages are easier and simpler to use as compared 
to old-style collateral mortgages. There are only two documents for 
the mortgagor to sign: the mortgage agreement and a promissory 
note or other written evidence of indebtedness secured by the 
mortgage. There is no collateral mortgage note and collateral 
pledge/UCC security agreement, and there is no need for the 
debtor to pledge a collateral mortgage note to secure the real 
indebtedness. Second, there is no need to explain why it is 
necessary for the debtor/mortgagor to sign two separate notes: one 
evidencing the mortgage loan and the other in the form of a 
collateral mortgage note, which may be in an amount greater than 
the mortgage loan.328 Third, there is no collateral mortgage note for 
the mortgage lender to lose or misplace, which can have disastrous 
consequences resulting in a collateral mortgage ceasing to be 
effective as between the parties and as affecting third persons just 
                                                                                                             
 326. Rubin et al., supra note 2.  
 327. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3298 cmt. a (2015). 
 328. See RUBIN, supra note 21, ¶ 13.11(a) (discussing the amount of the 
collateral mortgage note). 
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as if the mortgage had never been granted in the first place.329 
Fourth, a multiple indebtedness mortgage is effective against third 
persons and takes its ranking priority from the time the mortgage is 
recorded in the public mortgage records regardless of any initial or 
intermediate time when there is no mortgage debt and there is no 
then-binding commitment to lend funds at a later date. This is a 
definite advantage when using a multiple indebtedness mortgage in 
a construction loan situation where the goal is to make the 
mortgage effective against third persons before work commences 
on the project. And finally, multiple indebtedness mortgages are 
based solely on statutory authority, meaning that it is less likely 
that multiple indebtedness mortgages will be subject to uncertain 
and unpredictable interpretation and application by practitioners 
and by the courts.  
Those practitioners and mortgage lenders who continue to use 
old-style collateral mortgages will continue to face the uncertainty 
and risks of misinterpretation and misapplication of the rules that 
apply to post-1989 collateral mortgages. The most serious risk to 
lending lawyers and their clients is that the courts will continue to 
misapply the pledge articles of the Louisiana Civil Code and the 
pre-1990 collateral mortgage cases, including Odom v. Cherokee 
Homes, New Orleans Silversmiths v. Toups, First Guaranty Bank v. 
Alford, Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, and Citizens National 
Bank v. Coates, to post-1989 collateral mortgages granted on and 
after January 1, 1990.330 Sciortino v. Bank of Louisiana331 is an 
example of just such a case. 
Collateral mortgages are obsolete in the same way that a 20-
year old Toyota Camry is obsolete. If it works, someone surely 
will try to drive it. Collateral mortgages still work, but like a 20-
year old Toyota Camry works—cumbersomely and, at times, with 
unpredictable results. Nevertheless, despite the obvious advantages 
of using multiple indebtedness mortgages, some lawyers surely 
will continue to use old style collateral mortgages out of a 
reluctance to change what they have been doing for years, and 
because they think they know how collateral mortgages work, with 
some lawyers not fully understanding or appreciating the nuances 
of Louisiana collateral mortgage law and how collateral mortgage 
law significantly changed in 1990 with the enactment of Louisiana 
UCC Article 9 and the Louisiana collateral mortgage statute.  
  
                                                                                                             
 329. See supra Part I.D.3.  
 330. See Willenzik, Future Advance Priority Rights, supra note 1, at 47–48. 
 331. 705 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (discussed supra in Part I.F of this 
article). 
 
 
 
 
 
